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INTRODUCTION
In law, as in science, a phenomenon that refuses to conform with
orthodox theory should inspire reexamination of the theory.' Scientists
have difficulty explaining phenomena that inconveniently challenge
their presuppositions. It is easier and more respectable for lawyers to
do so. We observe and analyze judicial opinions rather than physical
I See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUrIONS 97 (2d ed. 1970).
Kuhn argues that the most dramatic scientific advances result from revolutionary
changes of the scientific "paradigm." By paradigm, Kuhn means a scientific world view
that gives scientists a basis for explaining most of the phenomena they observe. See id.
at 10-11. Scientific revolutions destroy an existing paradigm and replace it with a new
one that explains phenomena that resisted explanation by the preexisting paradigm. See
id. at 92-93.
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phenomena. We can usually dismiss opinions as mistaken and urge that
judges abandon them. Nonetheless, an enduring legal phenomenon that
contradicts common assumptions concerning our legal system may call
for changes in those assumptions. This Article posits that the political
question doctrine is such a phenomenon, and that its existence chal-
lenges orthodox notions about judicial review and the role of courts in
our constitutional system.
Since judges first claimed the power of judicial review, they have
tried to define a category of "political questions" outside the scope of
that power.2 To many who make their living writing about constitu-
tional law, this effort is an embarrassment. Limiting the power of judi-
cial review is inconsistent with the assumptions of many modern legal
scholars regarding the role of courts in our constitutional order. As a
result, contemporary commentary concerning the political question doc-
trine is often hostile to it. Commentators attack the doctrine as inconsis-
tent with basic principles of our constitutional practice, but these at-
tacks are unsuccessful. Their failure reveals flaws in the critics'
assumptions about the role of the judiciary in our constitutional system.
Critics of the political question doctrine have put forward two
closely related theses: either the doctrine does not exist3 or it does, but
should not." Both of these theses are based on the same two intertwined
assumptions: 1) the judiciary is the only institution with the authority
,aud capacity to interpret the Constitution and 2) to limit the judicial
monopoly on constitutional interpretation is to threaten, if not destroy,
the rule of law. These two assumptions are intertwined because critics
commonly offer the second as support for the first. I will refer to the
2 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (discussed infra text
accompanying notes 8-9).
1 See, e.g., Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597,
600 (1976) ( "The thesis I offer for discussion is that there may be no doctrine requir-
ing abstention from judicial review of 'political questions.' "); McCormack, The Jus-
ticiability Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595, 614 (1987)
(stating that the doctrine is "more easily demonstrated to be nonexistent than any other
nonjusticiability doctrine"); cf. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 596 (1966) ("[W]hatever sense I have been
able to find [in political question cases] seems to point toward an understanding of the
doctrine, which . . . is quite limited in its scope of actual and potential relevance.").
" See, e.g., Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Question": A Response, 101
HARV. L. REV. 524, 529 (1987) ("I see the political question doctrine as being at odds
with our commitment to constitutionalism and limited government, to the rule of law
monitored and enforced by judicial review."); Redish, Judicial Review and the "Politi-
cal Question," 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031, 1059-60 (1985) (asserting that the moral cost
of judicial abdication outweighs its benefits); Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political
Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135, 1136 (1970)
(arguing that federal courts should not abstain from ruling on American military in-
volvement abroad on the basis of the political question doctrine).
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first as the "judicial monopoly" assumption 5 and to the second as the
"cataclysmic consequences" assumption.
If these assumptions were valid it would follow that there should
be no political question doctrine. If the Constitution commits all inter-
pretation to the judiciary, and exceptions to this rule threaten the con-
stitutional framework, courts should never rely on the political question
doctrine to relinquish their charge as interpreters of the Constitution.
This Article will argue that these assumptions are not valid, or
even plausible. It will analyze this argument within the structure of
Ronald Dworkin's two dimensional model of interpretation. Dworkin's
model directs us to test interpretations both for their fit with our tradi-
tion and for their normative appeal as a matter of political morality.'
' This term derives from Donald Morgan's phrase "judicial monopoly theory,"
which he used to describe the theory that constitutional interpretation is the exclusive
province of the judiciary. See D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTrtrrION 89-96
(1966).
' Dworkin recommends that judges measure possible interpretations of legal texts,
including the Constitution, along both a dimension of "fit" and a dimension of "politi-
cal morality." He argues that judges should choose from among interpretations that
adequately fit our traditions the one that shows our "community's structure of institu-
tions and decisions" in the best light "from the standpoint of political morality." R.
DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 256 (1986). Dworkin makes it clear that the threshold re-
quirement of fit will sometimes rule out interpretations that a judge considers desirable
as a matter of political morality: "[I]f [a judge's] threshold of fit is wholly derivative
from and adjustable to his convictions of justice, so that the latter automatically provide
an eligible interpretation-then he cannot claim in good faith to be interpreting his
legal practice at all." Id. at 255. He also makes it clear, however, that one should apply
the fit test less stringently when an interpretation has particularly strong normative
appeal. See id. at 247-48.
Dworkin's theory of interpretation has not escaped criticism. Stanley Fish claims
that Dworkin's description of the dimension of fit assumes that texts impose constraints
on the interpreter. See Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551, 559 (1982) (criticizing Dworkin for assuming "that
history in the form of a chain of decisions has . . . the status of a brute fact"). Fish
argues that there is no such constraint on the interpreter. To the contrary, texts, both
literary and legal, are subject to any interpretation that can find acceptance in the
relevant interpretive community. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 15-16 (1980). This conceptual attack
does not make Dworkin's theory of interpretation any less useful as a framework for
constitutional analysis. Even if Dworkin is confused about the ontological status of
texts, his theory is an excellent description of the way in which those who belong to the
American legal community approach constitutional interpretation. Even scholars who
have broad areas of disagreement with Dworkin describe interpretation in terms very
similar to his. For example, Duncan Kennedy characterizes judicial interpretation as a
process of accommodating the legal materials that constrain the judge, thus acknowl-
edging the dimension of fit, to her preferred result in the case that she is interpreting,
relying on a preference shaped by the normative dimension of political morality. See
Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 548-51 (1986). Kennedy's judge is not as pure of heart as Dwor-
kin's Hercules, but their similarities in thinking about legal problems are much more
important than their differences.
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This Article will show that the judicial monopoly assumption embodies
an interpretation of our constitutional practice that does not "fit" our
tradition. The cataclysmic consequences assumption is best understood
as an effort to shore up the ill-fitting judicial monopoly interpretation
with a claim that it has great normative appeal. This effort is a failure;
there is no compelling case for the judicial monopoly assumption as a
matter of political morality.
In sum, the interpretation that underlies the criticisms of the polit-
ical question doctrine fails both the test of fit and the test of normative
appeal. Consequently, we need a different interpretation. Any interpre-
tation that fits our tradition must acknowledge that courts share re-
sponsibility for interpreting the Constitution with the political branches
of government. The political question doctrine is just one device courts
use to define this division of responsibility. Moreover, an interpretation
can acknowledge our system of shared responsibility without becoming
vulnerable to normative critique. This conclusion does not necessarily
imply that courts have articulated the political question doctrine coher-
ently. To the contrary, commentators have properly criticized the Su-
preme Court's explanation of the political question doctrine. They have
shown that nothing in the Court's explanations helps distinguish cases
in which judicial review is routinely available from cases that are im-
mune from review because they present political questions.7 Although
this criticism does not support a claim that the courts should abandon
the political question doctrine, it demonstrates the need for a better
explanation.
Full development of such an explanation is beyond the scope of
this Article. Nevertheless, one may begin to see the outline of such an
explanation by recognizing that the courts share responsibility for con-
stitutional interpretation with the political branches of government. To
explain the doctrine fully, one must answer the broad question of how
properly to divide responsibility for constitutional interpretation be-
tween courts and other decision makers. A rough sketch of the answer
to that question, however, is enough to give direction and meaning to
political question analysis.
The first Part of this Article will describe the development and
current status of the political question doctrine. Part II will describe
and analyze the critical commentary that has grown up around the doc-
trine. Part III demonstrates that critics of the political question doctrine
rest their criticisms on an interpretation of our constitutional practice
7 See McCormack, supra note 3, at 614-26; Redish, supra note 4, at 1034-35;
infra notes 244-52 and accompanying text.
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that fails the threshold test for fit. Part IV will show that this underly-
ing interpretation also is without any compelling normative support.
Part V will sketch a better interpretation of our practice and the role of
the political question doctrine within it. This alternative is based on the
assumption that our system divides responsibility for constitutional in-
terpretation among the three branches of government. This "divided
responsibility" model both fits our practice and has normative appeal.
I. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS
The political question doctrine stems from Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison.8 Even as he claimed the power
to decide questions of law authoritatively for all three branches of gov-
ernment, Chief Justice Marshall recognized limitations on that power:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.
Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the con-
stitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court."
Apparently Chief Justice Marshall assumed a sharp, stable distinction
between issues of law that courts must resolve and political questions
they must permit others to answer.
Luther v. Borden'° demonstrated the difficulties with this assump-
tion. Plaintiff in Luther sought damages for trespass to his Rhode Is-
land home. Defendants admitted to breaking into plaintiff's house and
searching it, but argued that they did so in the service of the state gov-
ernment. Plaintiff countered that the government to which defendants
referred, the charter government under which Rhode Island had oper-
ated before the revolution, was not the lawful government of Rhode
Island. This counterargument was not frivolous: the alleged trespass
occurred during the Dorr Rebellion of 1842, in which defendants ac-
cused plaintiff of participating, which resulted from a dispute about the
legitimacy of the charter government." Plaintiff, thus called on the
s 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9 Id. at 170.
10 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). Luther combined two cases into one, as both Mar-
tin and Rachel Luther were suing Luther Borden and others on identical facts. See id.
at 2.
11 For a summary of the facts of the case, including the historical facts of the Dorr
Rebellion, see id. at 34-38.
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courts to decide whether the rebellion had been justified.1"
The Supreme Court refused to make such a decision. Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Taney recognized that the Constitution man-
dates a particular form of government for the states.1 It follows that if
plaintiff could show that the charter government did not meet the re-
quirements of the mandate, then defendants could not rely on its au-
thority to shield them from liability and plaintiff should prevail.1
12 See id. at 20.
a Chief Justice Taney cited the guarantee clause and argued that only Congress
could determine what government is established in a state and whether it is "republi-
can." Id. at 42.
14 Professor Henkin argues that this is not what the plaintiffs in Luther sought to
show. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 608 n.33. He treats Luther as a case in which the
plaintiffs failed to invoke any constitutional limit on the powers of the political
branches of government. According to Henkin, they failed to show any constitutional
requirement that Congress or the President prefer either the charter government or its
competitor: "Petitioners did not allege that the charter government failed to satisfy the
requirement for a republican form of government, that the other regime was 'more
republican' or that the act of Congress in recognizing it violated some other provision of
the Constitution." Id. In the absence of such a requirement, the Court had to sustain
any choice the political branches made between the two contending Rhode Island gov-
ernments. This interpretation permits him to conclude that Luther "established no pure
'political question doctrine.'" Id. at 608.
This argument mischaracterizes the claim that the petitioners brought to the Court
in Luther. They argued at great length that the people of Rhode Island had a right to
change their government by constitutional convention, that they had done so, and that
the charter government had no legitimacy after the change. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7
How.) at 19-21. The summary of petitioners' brief that appears in the case report cites
a number of authorities to support this argument and concludes: "All these go to estab-
lish the constitutional right of changing State forms of government." Id. at 25.
The notes of the arguments do not indicate that petitioners cited constitutional text
in support of the proposition that it guarantees this right. One explanation for this
omission is that nineteenth century lawyers did not have the aversion to relying on
natural rights in constitutional argument that we have today. See, e.g., Shaw v. Cooper,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 303 (1833) (summary of appellant's brief) (discussing the natural
rights of men pertaining to copyright); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386,
387 (1798) ("It appears to me a self-evident proposition, that the several state legisla-
tures retain all the powers of legislation, delegated to them by the state constitutions;
which are not expressly taken away by the constitution of the United States."); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 8-1, at 560 (2d ed. 1988) ("During the
17th and 18th centuries, there evolved an American tradition of 'natural law,' postulat-
ing that 'certain principles of right and justice . . . are entitled to prevail of their own
intrinsic excellence.'" (quoting Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American
Constitutional Law (pt. 1), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 152 (1928) (emphasis deleted by
Tribe))). Petitioners' attorney may have felt no need for such support.
It would not distort petitioners' argument to modernize it as follows: The Consti-
tution directs the United States to guarantee every state a republican form of govern-
ment. In our tradition, one aspect of such a government is that it is subject to change at
the will of the people expressed through a constitutional convention. When the people
of Rhode Island made such a change, the Constitution mandated that the United States
recognize the new government and protect it against its predecessor. In accord with this
mandate, the Court has an obligation to treat defendants as mere trespassers. Any ac-
tions by the political branches of government inconsistent with this mandate are nulli-
19881
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Chief Justice Taney indicated, however, that only the political branches
of government could enforce the constitutional mandate in question.15
Because the President had accepted the charter government at the time
of the Dorr Rebellion, the Court would not reach an inconsistent
result."'
By ordinary criteria, whether the charter government matched the
Constitution's specifications for an acceptable state government seems to
be a legal question. It is difficult to distinguish it from the sort of ques-
tion Chief Justice Marshall had claimed the power to answer authori-
tatively in Marbury. Yet the Court treated the question as a political
one that the President could answer free from any judicial revision.
Thus, with the Luther opinion, Chief Justice Marshall's Marbury dic-
tum distinguishing political and legal questions became the basis for an
ill-defined exception to the scope of the judicial authority Marbury
claimed for the courts.
The Supreme Court has done little to clarify this exception. On
rare occasions, it has employed the political question doctrine to avoid
reaching the merits of a case."7 Paradoxically, the opinion that includes
ties. Chief Justice Taney seems to have understood petitioners to make roughly this
argument; he acknowledged that the guarantee clause imposes limits on state govern-
ments, but held that only Congress could enforce it. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at
42.
Once we recognize that this is the substance of what the petitioners argued, Hen-
kin's optimistic account of Luther's implications will not work. Petitioners brought the
Court a constitutional challenge to the validity of the charter government, and the
Court said that the political branches of government had already rejected that
challenge.
See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
16 Chief Justice Taney noted that the President had expressed his willingness to
support the charter government with military force. This led him to conclude:
"[C]ertainly no court of the United States, with a knowledge of this decision, would
have been justified in recognizing the opposing party as the lawful government." Id. at
44. Concern over problems of proof associated with any attempt to determine the legiti-
macy of an established government also played an important role in his reasoning. He
was concerned both about a court's capacity to find the requisite facts and about
problems of consistency if the outcome of such cases depended on jury findings of fact
necessary to determine the legitimacy of the charter government. See id. at 40-43.
"7 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (stating that questions involving the extent to which Congress
is authorized to negate the action of the President in foreign policy matters are "'politi-
cal' and therefore nonjusticiable"); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946)
(holding that the duty to secure fair representation of the states in the House of Repre-
sentatives has been committed to the exclusive control of Congress); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918) (taking as given that the Executive's official
recognition of the Mexican regime touched on foreign relations and consequently was a
matter committed to the political departments and beyond judicial review); Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 143 (1911) (finding Luther absolutely
controlling in holding that enforcement of U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4, belongs to the
legislative branch).
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the Court's best effort to clarify that doctrine rejects its application. In
Baker v. Carr,18 Justice Brennan summed up the law of political ques-
tions as of 1962. As will be shown, the few subsequent Supreme Court
cases have done little to expand or improve upon his work.
Baker involved a challenge under the equal protection clause to
malapportionment of legislative districts in Tennessee. Seventeen years
earlier, in Colegrove v. Green,19 the Court had refused to consider a
similar challenge to malapportionment of congressional districts in Illi-
nois. Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion in Colegrove was a strong
statement of the political question argument against considering such
cases, identifying reapportionment as a "political thicket" that courts
would not enter.2°
Justice Brennan set out to justify a different result in Baker. In
laying the foundation for his argument that the political question doc-
trine should not apply to the case, he gave that doctrine its fullest judi-
cial treatment to date. Justice Brennan surveyed the issues that the
The ambiguity in the doctrine has been increased further by the fact that the
Court frequently has divided in its interpretation of the doctrine. Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939), for example, involved an attempt to nullify the Kansas legisla-
ture's ratification of the Child Labor Amendment. The case presented two principal
issues: first, whether the legislature could properly ratify the amendment, having once
rejected it, and second, whether too much time had passed after Congress enacted the
amendment for any ratification to be effective. Three justices held that both of these
questions were political. Three more held that all questions having to do with the
amendment process are for Congress to answer "subject to no judicial review." Id. at
459 (Black, J., concurring). With respect to the second issue, the plurality maintained
that the Constitution requires ratification within a reasonable time, but argued that
only Congress can determine how much time is reasonable in a particular situation.
Compare McCormack, supra note 3, at 617 ("Coleman is nothing other than a deci-
sion that the Constitution alone does not impose an expiration date.") with Scharpf,
supra note 3, at 589 ("It is one thing for the Court to strike down the Child Labor
Law as incompatible with its choice of constitutional values . . . but it would seem to
be quite a different matter if the Court could, by a narrow interpretation of the amend-
ment procedures, prevent the ratification of the amendment which was intended to
overrule [its decision]. . . . [T]his seems to be one instance in which the Court cannot
assume responsibility for saying 'what the law is' without, at the same time, undermin-
ing the legitimacy of its power to say so.").
"8 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
19 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
20 See id. at 556. Justice Frankfurter wrote: "Courts ought not to enter this politi-
cal thicket. . . . The Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our gov-
ernmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and,
ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights." Id. The
Court recently decided that redistricting presented a justiciable question. See Davis v.
Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2800 (1986). At least one observer has noted that the
opinions in Davis seem overly concerned with the subjective motivations of the legisla-
tors, putting the Court in the midst of the political thicket that Justice Frankfurter
sought to avoid in Colegrove. See Comment, Politics and Purpose: Hide and Seek in
the Gerrymandering Thicket After Davis v. Bandemer, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 183, 215-
28 (1987).
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Colegrove Court had treated as political and distilled the following cri-
teria from them:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a politi-
cal question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one
question.2"
The Supreme Court has, for the most part, rested on this state-
ment of the political question doctrine. Powell v. McCormack22 is one
of the few major Supreme Court opinions after Baker discussing the
doctrine. In Powell, the Court merely quoted and applied Justice Bren-
nan's summary of the defining characteristics of a political question.
Powell presented the question whether Congress could constitutionally
refuse to seat Adam Clayton Powell.2 3 Most of the discussion of the
political question doctrine is devoted to examining the constitutional
text and history in an attempt to determine whether this issue was tex-
tually committed to Congress.24
The political question doctrine is more prominent in the opinions
of the lower federal courts. The Supreme Court has avoided, with its
power to deny certiorari, resolving divisive issues25 that some lower
courts avoided by applying the political question doctrine. For example,
some lower courts have held the constitutionality of both the war in
21 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
22 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
23 See id. at 489.
24 See id. at 522-47. The Court determined that it was not. This result was made
almost inevitable by the Court's view of its role as expressed near the end of the opin-
ion: "[I]t is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution." Id. at 549 (citing Marbury v. Madison). If this is the Court's role, how
can the Constitution commit questions about what it means to anyone else?
21 See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that a
suit by members of Congress against the President, challenging the legality of the
United States' presence in and military assistance to El Salvador under the War Pow-
ers Resolution and the war powers clause of the Constitution, was a nonjusticiable
political question), affid, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251
(1984).
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Vietnam26 and of American involvement in Nicaragua 7 to be nonjusti-
ciable political questions. The Supreme Court has not addressed itself
to a case that presented either issue.28
Although the political question doctrine may have had more prac-
tical impact in the lower courts than in the Supreme Court, it has not
received any more illumination there. Most cases do little more than
cite Baker v. Carr.29 A few discuss Justice Brennan's criteria in some
2 See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309-12 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974);
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd mem. sub nom. Atlee
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). In each of these cases except Mitchell, the court
held that a claim that the war or some aspect of it was unconstitutional in the absence
of formal congressional approval presented a political question. In Mitchell, the court
was prepared to consider such a claim. See id. at 616. It refused, however, to consider
whether President Nixon was doing his best to end the war. See generally Sugarman,
Judicial Decisions Concerning the Constitutionality of United States Military Activity
in Indo-China: A Bibliography of Court Decisions, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 470
(1974) (giving a general overview and bibliography of cases related to American in-
volvement in Indo-China).
Much of the scholarly hostility to the political question doctrine seems to spring
from disappointment over the judiciary's refusal to support efforts to end that conflict.
See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 3, at 623-24 (arguing that courts should have considered
the constitutionality of prosecuting a war that Congress did not declare); Redish, supra
note 4, at 1048 ("[I]f the [Constitution] provides . . . that it is Congress' province to
declare war, one may ask why it is appropriate for the courts . . . [to conclude] that
the conduct of military affairs . . . must lie in the executive's uicontrolled discretion."
(footnote omitted)); Tigar, supra note 4, at 1135-36 ("I urge that the federal courts
.. . have the power, and in an appropriate case, the duty, to decide the constitutional
and federal law issues posed by American military involvement abroad, in Indochina
today and in any future conflict.").
27 See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 568 F. Supp. 1236, 1238-40 (D.D.C.)
(holding nonjusticiable as a political question a private citizen's challenge to the U.S.
Government's use of private land in Honduras for military purposes), affd on other
grounds, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd on reh'g, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985), affd on other
grounds, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp.
596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that claims arising out of U.S. government actions in
Nicaragua presented nonjusticiable political questions), affid, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (Scalia, J.). Similar issues have arisen with respect to El Salvador. See, e.g.,
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that a suit by members
of Congress against the President, challenging the legality of the United States' pres-
ence in and military assistance to El Salvador under the War Powers Resolution and
the war powers clause of the Constitution, was a nonjusticiable political question),
affd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
28 The Court did affirm Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), but it
did so without an opinion. See Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1972).
29 See, e.g., Ramp v. Reagan, 758 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1985) (unpublished opinion)
(holding, with a bare citation to Baker, that a petition for mandamus to compel the
President to file suit in the International Court of Justice presented a political ques-
tion); Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 755 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.
1985) (upholding lower court's dismissal under Baker of a suit to prevent deployment
of cruise missiles), affg 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Republic of Panama v.
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depth,30 but none adds much to our understanding of those criteria. 3'
Nature abhors a vacuum. Thus, the dearth of meaningful judicial
discussion about the political question doctrine has drawn a number of
commentators to try their hands at illuminating that doctrine.
II. SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY ON THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE
Modern debate about the political question doctrine began as a
quarrel over the implications of that doctrine for contending theories of
judicial review. Some scholars used the doctrine as support for an effort
to discredit a traditional theory of review and make room for a replace-
ment. Others fought back, attempting to demonstrate the consistency of
the political question doctrine with that theory.
More recent commentators have, however, lost touch with the close
connection between theories of judicial review and the political question
doctrine. This disengagement has been at least partly responsible for
the failure of their assault on that doctrine; it has led them to rest their
arguments on implausible assumptions that they do not defend. A sur-
vey of the debate concerning the political question doctrine will reveal
the essential link between theories of judicial review and the political
question doctrine. It will also illuminate the arguments with which this
Article takes issue.
A. The Initial Debate: Political Questions and Judicial Review
Scholarly arguments about the proper role of judicial review in
Citizens and S. Int'l Bank, 682 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (concluding that
the political question doctrine precludes a suit by a foreign government that the execu-
tive branch has refused to recognize).
30 See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 339-40 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding
that cases concerning foreign relations are nonjusticiable because the government must
speak with a single voice, but failing to explain why the court may not interpret the
constitutional limits of that voice); Chaser Shipping Co. v. United States, 649 F. Supp.
736, 737-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The undisputed starting point [for a political question
analysis] is Baker v. Carr."); Greenham Women, 591 F. Supp. at 1335-36 ("The most
authoritative and commonly cited formulation of the political question doctrine is that
of Justice Brennan in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr.")
Si See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(holding that a suit seeking review of the result of a congressional election presents a
political question under Baker because of a textually demonstrable commitment of the
issue to Congress); United States v. Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438, 1440 (9th Cir. 1986) (ruling
that a challenge to the ratification of the sixteenth amendment presents a political ques-
tion under Baker); Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Reagan,
786 F.2d 194, 202 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that a challenge to diplomatic relations with
the Vatican raises a political question under Baker because "there is . . . a textually
demonstrable commitment with respect to recognition of foreign states").
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our constitutional order have consumed a huge quantity of ink in the
last thirty years. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, some scholars
sought to reconcile our theory and practice of judicial review with the
changes that realism and the New Deal made in the legal landscape. 2
The political question debate grew out of that effort.
Judge Learned Hand was one of the most influential early con-
tributors to this effort. 3 He argued that courts should rarely exercise
the power to declare a governmental act unconstitutional." To rebut
the charge that this argument was inconsistent with the role that the
Constitution gives to the courts, Judge Hand reexamined the basis for
the institution of judicial review. He claimed that the power of judicial
review is not grounded in the text or structure of the Constitution. In-
stead he found support for that power in the need for a final arbiter of
constitutional disputes to avoid the collapse of the federal government
through deadlock. 5 He concluded that judges are free to avoid any con-
stitutional issue whenever they find no pressing need to intervene. In
the absence of any mandate that judges decide all constitutional issues,
there could be no inconsistency between the constitutional role of judges
and Judge Hand's proposal that courts should use their power of judi-
cial review sparingly.36 For Judge Hand, the political question doctrine
played the key role of providing evidence that judicial practice con-
formed to his view that the Constitution does not impose an inflexible
duty on courts to decide any properly presented case.37
Professor Herbert Wechsler found Judge Hand's thesis disturbing
because it struck at the heart of the traditional justification for judicial
review.38 That justification, which Chief Justice Marshall hallowed in
32 See infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
s See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958) (originally presented as the Oliver
Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School).
3' See id. at 29 ("That is no doubt a dangerous liberty, not lightly resorted to
See id. ("[I]t was probable ... that without some arbiter whose decision
should be final the whole system would have collapsed . . .
s As Judge Hand wrote:
[S]ince [the power of judicial review] is not a logical deduction from the
structure of the Constitution but only a practical condition upon its suc-
cessful operation, it need not be exercised whenever a court sees, or thinks
that it sees, an invasion of the Constitution. It is always a preliminary
question how importunately the occasion demands an answer.
Id. at 15.
" Judge Hand used his gift for colorful turns of phrase to make this point. He
called the political question doctrine "a stench in the nostrils of strict constructionists."
Id. at 15.
38 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 1-10 (1959) (responding to Hand's lecture).
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Marbury v. Madison,"9 deduced the power to strike down unconstitu-
tional legislation from the judicial duty to decide cases.4 ° To concur
with Hand that the Constitution imposes no such duty on courts entails
rejecting this justification for judicial review. Professor Wechsler vigor-
ously defended the reasoning in Marbury.1 He argued that the politi-
cal question doctrine is not inconsistent with the premise of an inflexi-
ble judicial duty to decide cases on which that reasoning rests: "[Al
the [political question] doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts
are called upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to
another agency of government the autonomous determination of the is-
sue raised, a finding that itself requires an interpretation." '4 2 This, he
said, is "toto caelo different from a broad discretion to abstain or
intervene."
43
Shortly after the exchange between Hand and Wechsler, Alexan-
der Bickel joined the debate. He argued powerfully that the Marbury
justification for judicial review was flawed.4 4 He saw nothing in the
Constitution to prevent courts from choosing to decide some constitu-
tional issues and not others.45 Like Judge Hand, Professor Bickel
pointed to the political question doctrine as evidence of this freedom of
choice.4 ' Unlike Hand, however, he did not propose that courts should
use this freedom to circumvent most constitutional issues. 47 He put for-
ward a new justification for judicial review that supports far more judi-
cial activity than Judge Hand advocated.
Bickel justified judicial review as a tool for ensuring that govern-
ment remains appropriately principled. He believed that the judiciary
" 5 U.s. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
40 See infra note 150.
41 He argued that the power of judicial review "is grounded in the language of the
Constitution and is not a mere interpolation" as Judge Hand suggested. See Wechsler,
supra note 38, at 3. Wechsler identified the supremacy clause as the proper textual
"hook" for this power. See id. He concluded that, "[flor me, as for anyone who finds
the judicial power anchored in the Constitution, there is no ... escape from the judi-
cial obligation." Id. at 6. Wechsler bolstered his textual and logical arguments with a
practical one. He pointed out that Hand's theory could emasculate judicial review, for
if the only reason for judicial review is that without some review the government would
founder, review must either be confined to a very few cases or extended far beyond its
rationale. See id.
42 Id. at 7-8.
'3 Id. at 9.
44 See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-14 (1962).
15 See id.
46 See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 46 (1961).
17 Cf L. HAND, supra note 33, at 15 (stating that the court need not exercise
judicial review every time that it "sees, or thinks that it sees, an invasion of the
Constitution").
[Vol. 137:97
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
should be entrusted with such a tool because it is the institution best
able to derive principles from our "enduring values" and to educate the
public concerning those principles.48 To perform this function, he con-
cluded, the courts must have discretion to avoid issues when the time is
not right for their resolution.
He identified the political question doctrine as one device courts
can use to exercise this discretion. Bickel suggested that they invoke the
doctrine to dismiss cases that are poor vehicles for articulating and en-
forcing principles.49 By doing so whenever the extent to which a deci-
sion should be governed by principle is "circumstantial and varying,"5
they could avoid either legitimating the government's decision or over-
turning it.
51
Bickel elaborated his theory of the political question doctrine in a
much-quoted passage:
Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the
political-question doctrine: the Court's sense of lack of ca-
pacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness
of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b)
the sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance ju-
dicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial
judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will
not be; (d) finally ("in a mature democracy"), the inner vul-
48 See A. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 26-27.
4 See id. at 183-98.
5o Id. at 187.
"' See id. at 187-98. Reapportionment cases were one example he cited. He fo-
cused in particular on Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) and Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). He asserted that "[o]ne cannot with ... moral confidence proclaim
the principle of equal individual representation, holding everything else to be a tempo-
rary if necessary evil." A. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 192. Equality of representation
was "one goal" relevant to reapportionment decisions "and the only principled one,
among many." Id. In the absence of any principled way to accommodate these multi-
ple legitimate goals, Bickel indicated that most challenges to legislative apportionment
should be treated as political questions. See id. at 191-93. Although this argument
seemed to contradict the holding in Baker v. Carr, Bickel claimed consistency based on
a narrow reading of the case:
The decision in Baker v. Carr may . . . be read as holding no more than
that, Tennessee having last been malapportioned sixty years ago, the situ-
ation there is the result, not of a deliberate if imperfect present judgment
of the political institutions, but merely of inertia and oligarchic entrench-
ment. In the face of so faint an assertion, if any, by the political institu-
tions of their own function, the principled goal of equal representation had
enough vitality to enable the Court to prod the Tennessee political institu-
tions into action. . . .The Court here opened a colloquy, posing to the
political institutions of Tennessee the question of apportionment, not an-
swering it for them.
Id. at 196.
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nerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally
irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.52
Bickel was aware that this explanation did little to help courts distin-
guish political questions from ordinary constitutional issues. 3 He indi-
cated that there is a distinction between the two, but offered few sug-
gestions to help courts draw it.54
The debate among Judge Hand and Professors Wechsler and
Bickel focused on the extent to which the political question doctrine
authorized discretionary refusal to exercise review based on expedience.
Judge Hand and Professor Bickel both accepted such discretion, al-
though they recommended that it serve different functions. Professor
Wechsler rejected it, arguing that exceptions to judicial review must
rest on more principled grounds if the classic defense of judicial review
is to retain its vitality. That defense demands judicial resolution of
nearly all constitutional questions.
B. The Contemporary Debate
After Professor Bickel's contribution, debate about the political
question doctrine changed. The new participants tried to discuss the
doctrine without directly addressing the classic conundrums of judicial
review. They have gone even further than Professor Wechsler in as-
suming that judicial review must always be available to resolve consti-
tutional questions. They do not, however, defend any theory that could
justify that assumption. As a result, they build on a faulty foundation.
Bickel's arguments crippled the classic support for an absolute or near
absolute approach to judicial review; nobody has put forward an ade-
quate replacement.55
Professor Louis Henkin was the first important contributor to the
new genre of commentary on the political question doctrine. In an arti-
cle that set the tone for that genre, he argued that "[j]udicial review is
now firmly established as a keystone of our constitutional jurispru-
dence. A doctrine that finds some issues exempt from judicial review
cries for strict and skeptical scrutiny."5 6 After engaging in such scru-
tiny, Professor Henkin concluded that the Supreme Court had not ap-
12 Id. at 184.
" See id. at 184 ("The case does not exist in which the power of judicial review
has been exercised without some such misgivings being applicable in some degree.").
See id. at 184-85 ("There are cases of which no more need be said than what
Maurice Finkelstein said of Dred Scott v. Sandford: 'A question which involved a
Civil War can hardly be proper material for the wrangling of lawyers.' ").
5 See infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
5 Henkin, supra note 3, at 600.
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plied the political question doctrine to make any such exemptions; the
contrary impressions of most observers he attributes to confusion.
57
The Court, Professor Henkin argues, never invokes the political
question doctrine without either reaching the merits of the claim at is-
sue, however subtly, or disposing of that claim on procedural or equita-
ble grounds.58 The "political question doctrine" does not, therefore, ex-
ist: It "is an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of several established
doctrines that has misled lawyers and courts to find in it things that
were never put there and make it far more than the sum of its parts. 59
Professor Henkin recommends that "we [break] open that package, as-
sign[] its authentic components elsewhere, and [throw] the package
away."80
This argument permits Professor Henkin to avoid considering the
question whether exceptions to judicial review are inconsistent with the
judicial role under the Constitution. Because he concludes that the po-
litical question doctrine does not provide for such exceptions, he never
reaches that question. His choice of words, however, implies disap-
proval of exempting any issues from judicial review; chipping away at
a keystone is dangerous.
Professor Redish disputes Professor Henkin's conclusion that the
political question doctrine does not exist."1 Nonetheless, he shares im-
57 See id. at 600-25. Professor Henkin distinguishes decisions rejecting claims that
another branch of government exceeded the limits of its power from those refusing to
consider the merits of such claims at all. He sees failure to make this distinction as the
source of confusion confounding most commentators about the political question doc-
trine. As long as the court reaches the merits of such a claim, Henkin sees no extraordi-
nary exception to judicial review. Thus, if a court rejects the claim out of deference to
the government agency that allegedly exceeded its power, there is no cause for alarm.
See id. at 598-600 & n.8. Only if courts are entirely deaf to some set of constitutional
claims do they "forego their unique and paramount function of judicial review of con-
stitutionality." Id. at 599. Henkin's emphasis on this distinction harks back to Wechs-
ler's argument that the political question doctrine is just a routine form of constitutional
adjudication. See Wechsler, supra note 38, at 7-8. It is also reminiscent of Professor
Jaffe's argument that a decision to apply the political question doctrine represents a
judgment that no standards should confine political discretion in the area the decision
affects. See Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1265, 1303-04 (1961). That argument was a precursor of arguments in recent
work critical of the political question doctrine. See Redish, supra note 4, at 1048-49
(discussing "substantive" deference versus "procedural" deference).
" See Henkin, supra note 3, at 605-06, 617-22.
59 Id. at 622.
60 Id. at 625.
6 See Redish, supra note 4, at 1032-39. Redish makes the curious argument that
cases refusing to characterize an issue as a political question add to the evidence that
the doctrine exists, because "if no political question doctrine existed, there would have
been no need for the Court to expend so much effort to explain why the doctrine was
inapplicable." Id. at 1033. Redish finds further evidence for the existence of the politi-
cal question doctrine in opinions that decline to strike down government action after
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portant premises with Professor Henkin, taking the critique of the doc-
trine one step further in the same direction. For Professor Redish, any
exception to the rule of justiciability is inconsistent with the place of
judicial review in our constitutional jurisprudence.6 2 Accordingly, he
mounts a crusade for its extirpation, promising to show why "the doc-
trine should be given the total and complete repudiation it so richly
deserves." 3
Professor Redish tries to deliver on this promise by attacking both
Professor Wechsler's "classical" version of the political question doc-
trine, and Professor Bickel's "prudential" version. According to Profes-
sor Wechsler's version, the Constitution gives the government some
powers without authorizing the judiciary to restrict their exercise.64
Professor Redish is skeptical that anyone can articulate a basis for se-
lecting some power-granting provisions for review and exempting
others.65 He observes that even the most unlimited grant of power re-
mains subject to the general limitations on the exercise of government
power contained in various constitutional amendments.66 Those provi-
sions, he argues, should always be subject to judicial enforcement.
Thus, if Wechsler's version of the political question doctrine excludes
judicial review whenever the constitutional text grants a power in abso-
lute terms, it "is unacceptable because it disregards long accepted prin-
ciples of judicial review."'67 If it only means that the courts must uphold
governmental actions that do not violate any constitutional provisions, it
is "simply the product of the application of neutral principles of judi-
cial review."6 8
cursory review or despite the absence of any plausible argument for the constitutional-
ity of the action. See id. at 1037-39. He uses Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), as one example of such a case. He thus recognizes that judicial deference can
result in abdication of judicial review even when a court purports to exercise review.
See Redish, supra note 4, at 1037-39. He does not, however, seem to realize the full
implications of this recognition. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
82 See Redish, supra note 4, at 1059-60. Redish sums up his argument by point-
ing out that the political question doctrine "inherently implies that one or both of the
political branches may continue conduct that could conceivably be found unconstitu-
tional, without any examination or supervision by the judicial branch." Id. at 1060. He
regards this observation as the damning blow for the doctrine: "The moral cost of such
a result ... far outweighs whatever benefits are thought to derive from the judicial
abdication of the review function." Id.
63 Id. at 1033.
84 See Wechsler, supra note 38, at 8-9.
6 "[TIhe mere fact that a constitutional provision expressly refers to the exercise
of power by the political branches but not to the review role of the judicial branch
cannot justify an abdication of the review function, since judicial review is nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution." Redish, supra note 4, at 1042.
88 See id. at 1043.
67 Id. at 1039.
68 Id. at 1042.
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In responding to Professor Bickel, Professor Redish criticizes four
justifications for judicial abstinence that he distills from Bickel's theory:
1) the intractability of an issue to principled resolution, 2) "the judici-
ary's lack of institutional capacity to review particular judgments of
. . . the political branches," 3) "the judicial humility that flows from
the judiciary's . . . undemocratic nature," and 4) "fear that the judici-
ary's authority and legitimacy will be undermined by a blatant disre-
gard of its decision by the political branches." 9
Professor Redish rejects the first three justifications by demonstrat-
ing that they give us no basis for distinguishing political questions from
all other constitutional issues.70 With respect to the fourth justification,
he notes that the political branches of government are very unlikely to
ignore a judicial pronouncement.7 1 Even if they did, he doubts that the
courts' prestige would suffer more as a result of being ignored than it
would if courts turned their backs on sensitive constitutional issues. 2
Thus, Professor Redish concludes that "[o]nce we make the initial as-
sumption that judicial review plays a legitimate role in a constitutional
democracy, we must abandon the political question doctrine, in all of its
manifestations.
'73
The latest substantial contribution to the genre of political ques-
tion criticism is Professor McCormack's provocatively entitled article
The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of Law.74 Professor McCor-
mack argues that, as a matter of logic, the political question doctrine
cannot exist, because dismissing a challenge to governmental action on
the ground that the government is entitled to decide the constitutional-
69 Id. at 1043-44.
70 See id. at 1045-52. In regard to the first rationale, Professor Redish argues that
attempts to distinguish ordinary cases from cases that are not susceptible to "principled
resolution" prove too much. If courts refrained from review whenever an issue did not
lend itself to principled resolution, they would strangle the institution of judicial review.
See id. at 1047-50. "[A] substantial portion of all constitutional review" takes place
without the benefit of an inflexible governing principle to provide a clear standard for
judicial decision. Id. at 1047. Similarly, if the judiciary actually doubted its institu-
tional capacity to review particular judgments of the other branches of government and
acted on that doubt, judicial review would be effectively eliminated as a check on those
branches. Finally, the undemocratic nature of the judiciary might support an argument
against any judicial review. It does not, however, give us grounds for selective excep-
tions to the general rule that the judiciary will measure governmental action against the
requirements of the Constitution. See id. at 1045-46.
7' Redish argues that this justification is based on erroneous factual assumptions.
See id. at 1053-55. Professor Bickel also rejected the fourth justification, noting that the
Court can wield immense power in its role as "'teacher to the citizenry.'" A. BICKEL,
supra note 44, at 187-88 (quoting Wyzanski, Constitutionalism: Limitation and Affir-
mation, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 473, 485-86 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956)).
72 See Redish, supra note 4, at 1053-55.
73 Id. at 1059-60.
74 McCormack, supra note 3.
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ity of that action for itself is equivalent to holding that the challenged
action is constitutional. 5 He does not defend this claim of equivalence.
Instead, he repeats it in a number of different forms. 6
Professor McCormack's position is unique. All the other critics of
the political question doctrine have assumed that courts could leave an
issue to political resolution without resolving it. Professor Henkin ar-
gued that the Supreme Court actually reached the merits in political
question cases, but he never suggested that decision on the merits is
impossible to avoid. Thus, Professor McCormack brings a new twist to
the debate. Even though he concludes that every decision to dismiss on
justiciability grounds necessarily reaches the merits of the underlying
claim, Professor McCormack disapproves of the political question doc-
trine; he maintains that it is a dishonest and misleading practice.7 7 Mc-
Cormack considers various justifications for engaging in such dishon-
esty and rejects them ally.
7
71 McCormack indicates that Henkin relied on similar reasoning. For example, he
explains the disagreement between Henkin and Redish over the existence of the politi-
cal question doctrine as follows: "Redish looks to the manner of the Court's decision,
while Henkin and this author look at the results of the Court's decision." Id. at 616
n. 111. In summarizing Henkin's argument, he observes: "As Henkin asserts, however,
it should also be recognized that the effect of adjudication is the same regardless of how
the court labels its result." Id. at 626. The implication is that Henkin, like McCor-
mack, is committed to the view that if the petitioner loses, the Court has effectively
upheld the challenged action.
McCormack attributes to Henkin the argument that "the Supreme Court never
has and could not possibly avoid decision on a foreign affairs issue." Id. at 625. Henkin
does argue that the Court never has, or at least rarely has, avoided such an issue, but
he does not defend the broader claim that it is theoretically impossible for it to do so.
Henkin is careful to distinguish decisions that reach the merits of a claim from those
that fail to do so. His argument depends on that distinction. See supra note 57. Mc-
Cormack's insistence that all decisions necessarily reach the merits denies that such a
distinction exists. Other scholars share Henkin's insight that a political question deci-
sion can mask a determination on the merits. See, e.g., Champlin & Schwarz, Political
Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV.
215, 219-20 (1985) (arguing that political question cases based upon a lack of clear
standards for judicial determination "are simply merit determinations of constitutional-
ity"). But McCormack's broader thesis is, as far as I can tell, unique.
" Thus, he writes: "To say that a 'case' before the court is nonjusticiable is to say
that the plaintiff has no judicially enforceable right." McCormack, supra note 3, at
595. He adds: "[I]t is necessarily an exercise in interpretation and application of th[e]
law to say that the law applied by the court does not protect the plaintiff." Id.
" See id. at 614, 633. He never clearly explains why it matters whether a court
reaches the merits explicitly or does so implicitly while dismissing a claim under the
political question doctrine. If a court must resolve the same issues when it finds a lack
of justiciability that it would resolve if it reached the merits, it is difficult to see that
anything important turns on which route the court chooses to follow. McCormack may
be assuming that a court will give an issue fuller consideration if if faces the issue
explicitly. Any such assumption is open to doubt. See supra note 61.
"8 See McCormack, supra note 3, at 626-33. The justifications McCormack con-
siders are similar to those Redish distilled from Bickel's defense of the political question
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C. The Basis of the Contemporary Political Question Critique
Two separate strands of argument are evident in the positions of
the three contemporary critics. First, they urge us to reject the political
question doctrine as inconsistent with central principles of our constitu-
tional order. Second, they argue that the justifications others have of-
fered for the doctrine fail to articulate a distinction between political
questions and ordinary constitutional issues that are suitable for judi-
cial resolution.
1. The Political Question Doctrine as a Constitutional Abomination
Each of the critics makes in similar terms the claim that the politi-
cal question doctrine threatens the foundation of our constitutional or-
der. They all begin with the assumption that there should be no excep-
tions to the rule of judicial review.7 9 Professor Henkin has enough
optimism and ingenuity to satisfy himself that the political question
doctrine does not authorize any such exceptions."s Professor Redish,
lacking Henkin's optimism, attacks the political question doctrine as a
malignant anomaly."' Professor McCormack seems to concur with both
positions.82 I refer to their common starting point as the "judicial mo-
nopoly" assumption.
Professors Redish and McCormack convey the impression that
their attachment to the judicial monopoly assumption rests largely on
their fear of what might follow if we began making exceptions to the
rule of judicial review. They tell us that any provision of the Constitu-
tion that the judiciary will not enforce is meaningless. If courts refuse
doctrine. McCormack's grounds for rejecting those justifications are also similar to
those Redish put forward. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
" McCormack does not state this assumption as baldly as did his predecessors. It
is, however, an essential link in his argument that a decision invoking the political
question doctrine is always a disguised decision on the merits. That argument rests on
an assertion that any right courts will not enforce is not a legal right. That assertion
can be true only in a system that makes the judiciary responsible for resolving all legal
questions. Thus, exceptions to judicial review are antithetical to Professor McCor-
mack's argument. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
In a system that makes exceptions to the rule of judicial review, courts share re-
sponsibility for giving effect to the legal constraints of the Constitution with other gov-
ernment agencies. In such a system, institutions other than the judiciary may be
charged with protecting a right. If so, the absence of judicial enforcement does not
necessarily deprive that right of legal status.
0 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
82 See McCormack, supra note, 3 at 626 ("As Redish states, the [political ques-
tion] doctrine should be repudiated in favor of judicial review . . . . As Henkin asserts,
however, it should also be recognized that the effect of adjudication is the same regard-
less of how the court labels its result.").
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to enforce enough provisions, the political branches will run wild in the
jungle of a "constitutional state of nature.""3 The rule of law, which is
the heart of our constitutional system, depends on absolute judicial con-
trol over constitutional interpretation. 4 This outlook follows from what
I call the "cataclysmic consequences" assumption.
Those who adopt either of the assumptions described above have
no room for the political question doctrine in their conceptual universe.
This strand of argument in the work of the doctrine's contemporary
critics is the basis for their broad claim that the doctrine must be
rejected.
2. The Failure to Define Political Questions
The critics also make a narrower point. Professors Redish and
McCormack have shown that the traditional justifications for the politi-
cal question doctrine fail to explain why courts refrain from deciding
issues they label political questions when they decide other issues that
seem similar in all relevant respects.8 5 This second strand of argument
does not imply that the political question doctrine is irreconcilable with
the rest of our constitutional law. It merely suggests that we need a
better articulation of the basis for that doctrine.
The balance of this Article refutes the critics' broad first strand of
argument and attempts to remedy the deficiency revealed by their nar-
row second strand of argument. The first strand is weak because the
judicial monopoly assumption reflects an ill-fitting interpretation of our
constitutional practice. Moreover, the cataclysmic consequences as-
sumption is too unrealistic to provide strong normative support for that
interpretation. A better interpretation of our constitutional practice
reveals an answer to the question the second strand raises: How can we
draw a meaningful distinction between political questions and constitu-
tional issues that courts routinely resolve?
" Redish, supra note 4, at 1050 ("If the judiciary declines to resolve sensitive
constitutional disputes, the nation is effectively left in a constitutional state of nature.").
Professor Redish says that if the judiciary fails to resolve constitutional questions, "the
majoritarian branches are left totally unchecked." Id. at 1049.
1 As Professor McCormack states: "At least with regard to constitutional con-
straints, law must exist apart from the enforcers. . . .Otherwise, the game is given
completely to the politicians ...at which point constitutional law would become
nonlaw." McCormack, supra note 3, at 634 n.185.
85 See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text. Professor Fisher recently noted
that a federal judge's statement that "political question" refers to an issue that is
outside the sphere of judicial power "recalls this dictionary explanation: 'violins are
small cellos, and cellos are large violins.' " L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES:
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 110 (1988) (quoting Roche, Judicial Self-
Restraint, 49 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 762, 768 (1955)).
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III. THE JUDICIAL MONOPOLY ASSUMPTION AND OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
The judicial monopoly assumption fails to fit our constitutional
tradition. This failure reveals itself in several aspects of that tradition.
First, the judicial monopoly assumption is difficult to reconcile with the
role article III defines for the federal courts. Second, the political
branches have made many claims of authority that explicitly repudiate
that assumption. Finally, and most important, if the judicial monopoly
assumption is right, then a great deal of modern constitutional practice
is wrong. Each of these problems with the judicial monopoly assump-
tion merits further discussion.
A. The Role of Article III Courts
The judicial monopoly assumption suggests that there should be
no obstacles to judicial resolution of constitutional issues. If no other
institution can be responsible for such issues, we must submit them to
the judiciary and cannot tolerate any obstacle which prevents us from
doing so. Yet article III erects at least one such obstacle and permits
Congress to erect others. The requirement of article III that courts only
decide issues arising in the context of a case or controversy88 sets up a
barrier to judicial review. As Professor Thayer pointed out nearly a
century ago, that requirement may prevent some constitutional issues
from ever reaching the courts.87 Moreover, the Constitution gives Con-
gress extensive control over the federal courts' jurisdiction.8" This
power may permit Congress to block judicial consideration of many
constitutional questions. The anomaly between these aspects of article
III and the judicial monopoly assumption helps demonstrate the awk-
ward fit between that assumption and our constitutional tradition.
s See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
87 See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135-38 (1893). As Thayer observed: "The judiciary may
well reflect that if they had been regarded by the people as the chief protection against
legislative violation of the constitution, they would not have been allowed merely this
incidental and postponed control." Id. at 136.
88 The textual basis for this assertion is language in article III providing for only
such lower courts as "Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," U.S.
CONsT. art. III, § 1, and the language providing that "the Supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction . . . with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. There is no doubt that this
language gives Congress some power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Ex
Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-513 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441, 448 (1850). The scope of this power is, however, a subject of vigorous
academic debate. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
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1. Expansive Judicial Review and the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement
Courts and commentators have struggled with the tension between
an expansive vision of judicial review and the "case or controversy"
requirement. In the 1960s, the prevalence of a broad view of the judi-
cial role89 put tremendous pressure on courts to break out of the case-
or-controversy requirement's confines.9° At that time, the Supreme
Court responded to the pressure and relaxed the restrictions on the ju-
diciary that flow from the case-or-controversy requirement.91 The
8' The Supreme Court has expressed such a view of its own role in a number of
cases. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (stating that "it is the
responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution");
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that Marbury v. Madison "declared
the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution"). Indeed, in light of the conventional understanding of judicial review,
it is surprising that there are so few such cases in which the role of the judiciary has
been expansively described.
90 Any judge who adopts a broad view of the courts' role is likely to chafe when
constrained by a narrow definition of the circumstances under which constitutional ad-
judication is appropriate. As Professor Chayes put it, the ability to bring what he calls
"public law litigation" to the courts "is ultimately the ability to elicit judicial pro-
nouncements on the public policies and values implicated in the challenged official ac-
tions. Limitations on standing thus translate into limitations on the power of the courts
... " Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9-10 (1982).
9' An example of this response is Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Court
held in Flast that the plaintiffs had standing, by virtue of their status as taxpayers, to
challenge as a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment the use of
federal money for the benefit of religious schools. The Court reached this result despite
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), in which the Court had denied standing
to a plaintiff taxpayer who claimed injury resulting from allegedly unconstitutional
federal expenditures. The Court said that such a claim alleged merely that the plaintiff
"suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with people generally." Id. at 488.
The Flast Court attempted to distinguish Frothingham. The attempt was a spec-
tacular failure. The Court argued that taxpayers can have standing by virtue of their
status as taxpayers only if their claim is sufficiently related to that status. It indicated
that somehow the claim in Flast was more closely related to that status than the claim
in Frothingham. The Court's basis for this distinction was that Flast involved a chal-
lenge to an exercise of the taxing and spending power on the ground that the govern-
ment had violated a specific constitutional limitation on that power, but that Frothing-
ham involved an exercise of the commerce power that the plaintiffs had challenged as
beyond the scope of that power.
As Justice Harlan pointed out in his Flast dissent, however, the injury alleged was
exactly the same in both cases. In both cases, "the interests [the plaintiff] represents,
and the rights he espouses, are, as they are in all public actions, those held in common
by all citizens." 392 U.S. at 128-29 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Flast suggested that the
courts might begin hearing cases asserting the public interest. Its reasoning gave little
basis for picking and choosing among such actions, therefore raising the possibility that
the courts might hear a wide range of nontraditional cases. Indeed, it was fear of this
result that animated Justice Harlan's dissent: "There is every reason to fear that un-
restricted public actions might well alter the allocation of authority among the three
branches of the Federal Government." Id. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Scholars also
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Court has been more resistent to the pressure in recent years. 2 This
ebb and flow of article III doctrine arose in part from the difficulty of
reconciling the judicial monopoly assumption with traditional doctrine.
Academic writings reflect the same pressure that influenced judi-
cial opinions. Professor Monaghan argued in the early 1970s that re-
strictive rules governing "who may obtain constitutional declarations
and when" were inconsistent with courts' "special function" of re-
vealing the meaning of the Constitution.9" He urged the courts to recast
the definition of "case or controversy" to require primarily that issues
be "sharply defined and capable of judicial solution."9 Such a defini-
tion would permit the courts to fulfill their special function without
hindrance from outmoded conceptions of standing, ripeness, and
mootness.
This argument highlights the inconsistency between the traditional
understanding of these conceptions and a "special function" model of
the judicial role in our system. Professor Monaghan assumes the pro-
priety of a special function model and concludes that the traditional
definition of a properly presented case must yield.95 His insight is
equally useful as one element of an argument that a special function
model, at least in the extreme form to which the judicial monopoly
assumption would lead, cannot fit our constitutional tradition.96
saw far-reaching implications of Flast. See, e.g., Bittiker, The Case of the Fictitious
Taxpayer: The Federal Taxpayer's Suit Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen, 36 U.
Cm. L. REv. 364, 365 (1969) (acknowledging Flast as a "'cornerstone of the law of
standing,'" and maintaining that courts have "erected upon it an imposing ... struc-
ture" (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 601
(1968) (stating that the Flast holding seemed "destined to become a long-term corner-
stone of the law of standing"))).
92 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-66 (1984) (displaying a narrow
view of standing requirements in reversing a lower court's grant of injunctive and de-
claratory relief to parents of black children who had alleged that the IRS had not
adopted sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory private schools); Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1982)
(reading Flast narrowly to limit taxpayer standing to challenges directed at the exercise
of congressional, rather than executive or administrative, power).
"8 Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1370 (1973). Monaghan proposed that virtually unanimous agreement about the
Court's "special function" as sole interpreter of the Constitution means that "today, [it
is] simply unacceptable for the Court to dismiss as beyond judicial competence chal-
lenges by Congress to the practice of the pocket veto or to presidential attempts to
impound funds solely because traditional 'private' interests are not at stake." Id. at
1370 (emphasis in original).
94 Id. at 1371.
95 Id. at 1397 ("[Ilt is up to Congress to fashion the boundaries of a model of
judicial competence better suited to the Court's special function.").
" Monaghan's insight may be more useful for this latter purpose after the recent
Supreme Court opinions reaffirming the place of case-or-controversy doctrine in that
19s88
122 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
2. Congressional Control over Federal Jurisdiction
Congressional control over federal jurisdiction is another area of
constitutional law that poses a problem for proponents of the judicial
monopoly assumption. One can marshall an impressive array of au-
thorities for the proposition that when article III says "the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction . . .with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make, '19 7 it means the
Court's appellate jurisdiction is at the mercy of congressional whim."'
Nobody disputes congressional authority to control the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts.99 If our system leaves the courts at the mercy
of Congress, however, it values them less than the judicial monopoly
assumption suggests it should.
Congress has considered numerous proposals to use its authority
over jurisdiction to diminish the impact of controversial Supreme Court
opinions. It has, however, rejected almost all of them. 00 One might
therefore assume that a debate about congressional power to limit ap-
pellate jurisdiction is less than urgent, even pointless. Yet debate
tradition. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
97 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
98 See, e.g., Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 908
(1984) (arguing that the Constitution, Supreme Court language, and congressional
practice "all contribute to a compelling argument that there are no substantial internal
limits on Congress' article III power to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction"); see
also Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL.
L. REV. 1030, 1030-31 (1982) (stating that Congress decides what cases "to which the
federal judicial power extends should be litigated in the lower federal courts"); Hart,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953) (presenting a dialogue addressing the impli-
cations of Congress' power to limit federal court jurisdiction); Redish, Congressional
Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions
Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 903 (1982)
("Even if ... limits are found to exist, however, there will remain substantial oppor-
tunity for Congress to curb Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction."); Wechsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1965) (presenting the
same argument). One traditional argument is that the "counter-majoritarian" power of
judicial review is defensible only because Congress can curb the courts by restricting
their jurisdiction. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 125-39 (1982); cf. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 71 (1969) (arguing that judicial review rests on congressional acquies-
cence, which is shown in part by jurisdiction legislation).
9 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850).
100 See Gunther, supra note 98, at 897 ("[The jurisdiction-curbing] bills failed, a
fate that has befallen all such efforts directed at the Supreme Court-with one notable
exception . . . ."); see also Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18
VAND. L. REV. 925, 926 (1965) ("A total of only nine out of the 165 bills regulating
the Court have passed Congress.").
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rages,"'1 sustained by proponents of the judicial monopoly assumption
who are attempting to construct a consistent theory of the Constitution.
To do so, they must reconcile the exceptions and regulations clause
with their broad view of the Supreme Court's function. The literature
is rich with their efforts.1 2 They argue, for example, that Congress
cannot exercise its power to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction suf-
ficiently to "destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the con-
stitutional plan."103
A powerful counterargument is that the Supreme Court's role
must be understood in light of the exceptions and regulations clause.'"
That role should not be inflated to the point of inconsistency with the
textual indication of congressional supremacy. The argument that Con-
gress cannot destroy the Court's essential role arguably relies on such
inflation. Anyone who sees the force of this counterargument must con-
clude that the judicial monopoly assumption and congressional control
over jurisdiction are strange bedfellows. This incompatibility and the
case-or-controversy requirement help to show that the assumption fails
to fit our constitutional tradition. There are, however, other problems
with the fit of the assumption. Its proponents ignore many claims by
representatives of the political branches of government to authority over
constitutional interpretation as well as important aspects of our contem-
porary constitutional practice.
101 Professor Van Alstyne described the debate as "choking on redundancy" in a
letter to Professor Gunther. See Gunther, supra note 98, at 897 n.9.
102 For authors attacking congressional authority, see Ratner, Congressional
Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1.57,
171-72 (1960) ("[T]he Convention gave Congress authority to specify such orderly pro-
cedures and to modify the jurisdiction ...within the limits imposed by the Court's
essential constitutional role."); Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review:
Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. Ruv. 929, 933
(1982) (maintaining that unlimited congressional control over appellate jurisdiction "is
not consistent with the constitutional plan of judicial review"); Sager, The Supreme
Court 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 30 (1981)
(stating that, when Congress undertakes to limit jurisdiction, "it is fully bound by the
constitutional provisions that ordinarily constrain its behavior"). For authors who chal-
lenge the judicial monopoly assumption, see supra note 98.
103 This phrase originally came from Professor Hart's famous dialogue. See Hart,
supra note 98, at 1365. The dialogue did not, however, fully develop the implications
of the phrase. Hart conceded that Congress had extensive authority to limit federal
court jurisdiction. See id. at 1398-99.
104 Cf Redish, supra note 98, at 906-15 (examining the exceptions and regula-
tions clause and concluding that it implies no limitations on congressional authority to
control federal court jurisdiction).
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B. Political Branches' Claims of Interpretive Authority
Marbury v. Madison"0 5 is an American icon. Both lawyers and
lay people commonly read Chief Justice Marshall's statement "[it is
emphatically the province and duty of the [courts] to say what the law
is"' 0 6 for all it is worth.107 Even the most sophisticated commentators
sometimes argue that the broadest understanding of this language is so
much a part of our constitutional tradition that it needs no contempo-
rary defense.'0 8 Any suggestion that Marbury must mean less than the
full import of its most sweeping language is likely to provoke charges of
iconoclasm.109
Thomas Jefferson'" and Abraham Lincoln"' are also American
icons, however, and both made strong assertions of executive authority
over constitutional interpretation. Other chief executives have made
similar assertions," 2 and not all are mere relics of our distant past. The
Reagan Administration has been Jeffersonian, at least in this respect." 3
Early objections to Marbury were based on the theory that it
claimed a power for the judiciary inconsistent with the concept of three
'o5 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
106 Id. at 177.
107 See, e.g., Kauper, The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of State, 21 Sw. L.J.
573, 586-87 (1967) ("Americans take it for granted that the Supreme Court will exer-
cise [the] power [of judicial review]."). The Supreme Court has done little to discourage
this view. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
10I For example, Ronald Dworkin writes:
Marshall decided that the courts in general and the Supreme Court in the
last analysis have the power to decide for the government as a whole what
the Constitution means . . . . [Allmost two centuries of practice have put
his position beyond challenge .. . and the constitutional wars are now
fought on the terrain it defines.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 356-57. Dworkin argues that those who advocate judi-
cial restraint confuse the question of how the Constitution should be interpreted with
the question of who has the authority to interpret it. He says that "Marbury v.
Madison settled the second ...question, at least for the foreseeable future." Id. at
370.
1o It is important to note that such a suggestion need not be at odds with Mar-
bury itself, only with the very "imperialistic" reading of it that has become common.
See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASES AND MATERIALS 107 (2d ed. 1983) (coining the term "imperialistic" reading).
For example, Professor Van Alstyne describes a possible reading of Marbury that
makes quite modest claims of judicial prerogative. See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 ("The phrase 'in pursuance thereof'
might as easily mean 'in the manner prescribed by this Constitution,' in which case
acts of Congress might be judicially reviewable as to their procedural integrity, but not
as to their substance." (emphasis in original)).
10 See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
... See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 117-18 & 120 and accompanying text.
... See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
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separate and coequal branches of government." 4 Jefferson stressed this
theme in his correspondence more than once." 5 When he did so, his
hostility to Marbury was apparent. In a letter he wrote to the prosecu-
tor in the treason trial of Aaron Burr, President Jefferson agreed to
provide whatever evidence the court might need to ensure a just trial
but reserved the right to decide for himself whether the Court should
see any particular papers in his possession. The inconsistency between
this position and Marbury was not lost on Jefferson:
I think it material to stop at the threshold the citing that case
as authority, and to have it denied to be law . .. The Con-
stitution intended that the three great branches of the gov-
ernment should be co-ordinate, & independent of each other.
As to acts, therefore, which are to be done by either, it has
given no controul to another branch. . . Where different
branches have to act in their respective lines . . . they may
give to it different and opposite constructions ....
On this construction I have hitherto acted; on this I
shall ever act, and maintain it with the powers of the govern-
ment, against any control which may be attempted by the
judges, in subversion of the independence of the executive &
Senate within their peculiar department. . . I have long
wished for a proper occasion to have the gratuitous opinion
in Marbury v. Madison brought before the public and de-
nounced as not law .... 11
Andrew Jackson made a somewhat milder claim of executive au-
thority over constitutional interpretation in the message he sent Con-
gress with his veto of the 1832 act to renew the charter of the Bank of
the United States. Although the Supreme Court had upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland,1 17 President Jack-
114 See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting)
(attacking the doctrine of judicial review).
115 See, e.g., 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49, 51 (A. Lipscomb ed.
1904) (letter from T. Jefferson to Abigail Adams dated Sept. 11, 1804) ("[T]he opinion
which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not,
not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and execu-
tive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch."); 15 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 276-79 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904) (letter from T.
Jefferson to William 0. Jarvis dated Sept. 28, 1820) (disputing the argument that
judges are the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions on the ground that this
threatens the mutual independence of the three branches of government and thus of the
constitutional system itself).
"1 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 53-54 (P. Ford ed. 1898) (letter
from T. Jefferson to George Hay dated June 2, 1807).
117 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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son considered the issue still open:
It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its
constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as
settled . . . by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this
conclusion I can not assent.
...The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must
each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitu-
tion. . . .The opinion of the judges has no more authority
over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the
judges, and on that point the President is independent of
both." 8
In his first inaugural address, Abraham Lincoln took a similar
position concerning the force of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Constitution:
I do not forget the position assumed by some, that con-
stitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court;
nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any
case, upon the parties to a suit. . . .At the same time the
candid citizen must confess that if the policy of government,
upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be ir-
revocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the in-
stant they are made, in ordinary litigation . . . the people
will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that ex-
tent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of
that eminent tribunal.1
1 9
More recently, Franklin Roosevelt defended his infamous plan to
"pack" the Supreme Court by arguing that the Court had twisted the
Constitution to obstruct important social welfare legislation. He as-
serted the authority to interpret the Constitution, to find the Court's
actions inconsistent with his interpretation, and to act to bring the
Court into line with his view. His language was, as usual, forceful:
"We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the
Constitution itself.'
1 20
Recent events provide another example. Former Attorney General
Edwin Meese provoked a firestorm of criticism by claiming some exec-
118 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,
1789-1897, at 581-82 (J. Richardson ed. 1898).
119 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
120 Address by President Franklin Roosevelt (March 9, 1937), reprinted in 81
CONG. REc. app. 470 (1937).
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utive autonomy with respect to constitutional interpretation. 121 He
drew a sharp distinction between judicial opinions concerning the
meaning of the Constitution and the Constitution itself.'22 According to
the former Attorney General, the coordinate branches of government
can properly respond to a decision they consider erroneous. They are
not bound to obey decisions in the same way that they are bound to
obey the Constitution.
23
In light of all these dissident voices it is puzzling that so many
contemporary legal scholars and practitioners consider Marbury the fi-
nal word with respect to judicial review. There is no obvious reason
why a court's assertion of judicial power should be any more authorita-
tive than a President's assertion of executive power. Both are part of
our constitutional tradition, and there is no apparent way to establish
any priority between them.'
24
The claims made throughout our history that the nonjudicial or-
gans of government are entitled to a share of the power that the judicial
monopoly assumption assigns exclusively to the courts constitute one
more aspect of our constitutional tradition that that assumption falls to
fit. It remains to consider the far more serious charge that the judicial
monopoly assumption fails to fit modern constitutional practice as well.
C. Judicial Deference in Modern Constitutional Practice
The judicial monopoly assumption is not useful as a description of
constitutional practice in our system of government because judges re-
solve questions of constitutional interpretation only under limited, de-
fined circumstances. Such a system necessarily imposes substantial re-
sponsibility for constitutional interpretation on the political branches of
government.
A demonstration that our system makes the political branches of
government responsible for constitutional interpretation begins with an
uncontroversial observation: Congress and the President have a duty to
121 A critical reader might object to including the assertions of authority by both
Meese and Roosevelt in a list of incidents in our tradition inconsistent with the judicial
monopoly assumption, because both were widely condemned. So was Marbury in its
day. See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 232
(1922). Such condemnation is never universal.
122 See Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985 (1987).
123 See id.
124 To do so would require an exercise in circular reasoning: The question of who
can interpret the Constitution authoritatively is itself an interpretive question; the
Court resolved it in Marbury; we must accept that resolution because judicial interpre-
tations are authoritative.
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ensure that their actions conform to the law.12 5 Although members of
Congress occasionally call this principle into question,'26 the strongest
defender of the judicial monopoly assumption should find it inoffen-
sive. 2  Even private citizens with no special public responsibilities are
required to obey the law. 2 The rule of law depends on extending this
obligation to government officials; officials must have a duty to measure
their behavior against the requirements of law. The oath that the Presi-
dent takes to uphold the Constitution reflects this duty.'29
Congress and the President cannot discharge this duty merely by
ensuring that none of their actions are subject to challenge in court.
The courts do not oversee government operations and invalidate all ac-
tions that are inconsistent with the Constitution. There are any number
of situations in which a government official may contemplate an action
she believes to be unconstitutional, but knows the courts will not dis-
turb. In such a situation, the responsible official should act on her own
interpretation of the Constitution.'"0
2I See, e.g., Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 587-88 (1975) (arguing that a "conscientious legisla-
tor" has a duty to discern the constitutionality of a measure's objective before deciding
to support it).
"I See D. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 3-10 (discussing the behavior of some sena-
tors and representatives concerning various bills they believed to be unconstitutional).
For example, during hearings on the constitutionality of what ultimately became the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator Magnuson remarked:
I think we ought to get this in perspective. Congress doesn't determine
what is under the interstate commerce clause. The Constitution and court
decisions determine that ...
... We are talking about how far you want to go. . .in a particu-
lar field with a bill. . . .Whether a business is in interstate commerce or
not is a question of the interpretation of the Constitution and of the courts'
rules in these matters.
Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 71
(1963).
117 Indeed, defenders of the judicial monopoly assumption should be among the
most enthusiastic supporters of this principle. That assumption tends to be linked with
concern for maintaining the rule of law. See supra note 83-84 and accompanying text.
The essence of the rule of law is that government officials are obliged to obey the law.
12 Cf Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power To
Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 63 (1986) ("To suggest that Congress
need not consult the supreme law of the land is analogous to asserting that individual
citizens need not consult the law before they act.").
12 The Constitution states:
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, [the President] shall take
the following Oath or Affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and
will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
120 Cf Thayer, supra note 87, at 144 ("[O]ne who is a member of a legislature
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1. Legislators' Actions and Judicial Deference
One situation that calls for nonjudicial interpretation of the Con-
stitution arises when courts severely limit their role by reviewing a
challenged action under a rationality standard.131 Whenever courts test
may vote against a measure as being, in his judgment, unconstitutional; and, being
subsequently placed on the bench, when this measure, having been passed by the legis-
lature in spite of his opposition, comes before him judicially, may there find it his duty,
although he has in no degree changed his opinion, to declare it constitutional." (restat-
ing a remark of Judge Thomas Cooley)).
131 See Brest, supra note 125, at 594-99. Professor Brest posed the following rhe-
torical question: "[D]o the rationality standards comprehend all that the due process
and equal protection clauses usually demand of a legislature?" Id. at 595. He answered
the question, at least tentatively: "The very permissiveness of the rationality test may
indicate that it is a standard of judicial review of a prior decision made on the basis of
a more meaningful criterion." Id. at 599 (emphasis in original).
This argument does not imply that the rational basis test must always represent
judicial abdication of the power to say what the Constitution requires. Like any other
verbal formula, that test can mean different things in different situations. No doubt
some courts have engaged in meaningful review under the auspices of the rationality
test. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 16-3, at 1443-45 (describing instances of "covertly
heightened scrutiny" and referring to them collectively as a "sporadic move away from
near-absolute deference to legislative judgment"); see also Note, Rational Basis With
Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny By Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779 (1987) ("A
finding that ...regulations are unconstitutional under rational basis review implies
that the Court used a more searching scrutiny. This signals a break from traditional
equal protection analysis in which the Court applies only the most deferential standard
of review . . . ." (footnote omitted)). The argument that rationality review leaves the
political branches of government with substantial responsibility for constitutional inter-
pretation implies only that courts often have used the rational basis test to avoid mean-
ingful review. When they do, they leave constitutional questions to other decision mak-
ers. Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 16-2, at 1439-43 (noting that, under the rationality
requirement, courts have exhibited extreme deference to legislative purposes and acts,
resulting in a strong presumption of their constitutionality).
There are a number of other situations that allow constitutional interpretation to
be made by nonjudicial branches of government. Professor Brest identified one such
situation, which is closely related to rationality review. That situation arises out of the
courts' treatment of legislative motive. See Brest, supra note 125, at 589-94. It can be
argued that the Supreme Court has taken the position that the constitutional validity of
governmental action may depend on the actor's motives. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 136-45 (1980) (surveying the Court's treatment of legislative motive);
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205 (1970) (same). From this perspective, the motive of Congress in passing legisla-
tion may determine its constitutionality. However, courts are reluctant to invalidate
legislation on the ground that Congress passed it in order to achieve an illicit end.
Problems of proof discourage inquiry into motives. See J. ELY, supra, at 137-38. These
problems are far less discouraging for members of Congress. Unlike the courts, they are
in a position to assess their motives and those of their colleagues. A member of Con-
gress who thinks proposed legislation is an effort to achieve an unconstitutional end
should oppose that legislation even if the courts are certain to uphold it. See Brest,
supra note 125, at 587-88 (arguing that the "conscientious legislator" has a duty to
discern the constitutionality of a measure's objective before deciding to support it).
The definition of a properly presented case can also insulate from judicial consid-
eration questions of constitutional interpretation that the political branches of govern-
ment cannot avoid. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. Schlesinger v. Re-
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the constitutionality of legislation by asking whether the action is ra-
tionally related to some legitimate government purpose, the legislation
may well be repugnant to the Constitution even if it survives judicial
review. Judicial consideration under such a standard means only that a
rational person could conclude the requirements of the Constitution are
satisfied. A rational conclusion can be wrong. A legislator has a duty to
reach the right conclusion.132
Almost any case applying the rational basis test can serve to illus-
servists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), a standing case, also
illustrates this judicial insulation. The issue in Schlesinger was whether members of
Congress could hold commissions in the military reserves without violating the incom-
patibility clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff lacked
standing to bring the suit even though, as the lower court had pointed out, nobody else
would be likely to have it. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 208 (citing United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974)). The question whether the Constitution bars
members of Congress from holding commissions in the reserves was therefore one that
the judiciary could not resolve. The judiciary's abstinence left Congress as the only
branch of government that could consider the constitutional question.
132 This is essentially the same argument that underlies Professor Sager's "under-
enforcement thesis." See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1213-28 (1978). Sager argues that
courts often reject a constitutional claim because of "institutional concerns" rather than
out of a conviction that the Constitution does not support the plaintiff. When they do
so, their decision represents only "the boundaries of [their] role of enforcement" not the
full "conceptual limits" of the constitutional norm at issue. Id. at 1213.
After all, what the members of the federal tribunal have actually deter-
mined is that there are good reasons for stopping short of exhausting the
content of the constitutional concept with which they are dealing; the lim-
ited judicial construct which they have fashioned or accepted is occasioned
by this determination and does not derive from a judgment about the scope
of the constitutional concept itself.
Id. at 1221. Sager's prime example of circumstances under which "institutional con-
cerns" rather than substantive convictions mandate a result is the judiciary's use of the
"rational relationship" test in equal protection analysis. He draws three principal con-
clusions: 1) government officials are legally obligated to obey constitutional norms to
their fullest extent, not merely to conform to court decisions; 2) congressional enforce-
ment of constitutional norms can go further than existing doctrine; and 3) courts should
limit federal review of state cases that go further than federal doctrine in protecting
constitutional rights. See id. at 1264. The difference between Professor Sager's analysis
and my own is that I think his reasoning can support broader conclusions. He is cau-
tious in articulating the implications of his insights:
[I]t is understood that Supreme Court decisions are the ultimate and au-
thoritative source of federal constitutional interpretation. While I have
neither the impulse nor the temerity to quarrel with this root premise of
our legal system, I do want to register disagreement with its application to
one species of Supreme Court decision.
Id. at 1212-13. It seems to me that the characteristic of our system he identified is
evidence that supports the conclusion that the Supreme Court shares responsibility for
interpreting the Constitution with other institutions. This view requires at least enough
modification of the traditional view that the Supreme Court is the "ultimate and au-
thoritative source of federal constitutional interpretation" to make room for the political
question doctrine.
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trate the disparity between rationality and constitutionality. United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz33 is a familiar example.
Fritz was a challenge to a congressional statute that established two
classes of railroad workers: one class was entitled to receive benefits
under both social security and the railroad retirement system, the other
class was not.13 4 The Court indicated that the challenged classification
was valid if the workers who retained dual benefits had a stronger eq-
uitable claim to those benefits than the workers that lost them."3 The
majority held that Congress could rationally have found that equitable
considerations supported its classification, but the Court made only a
cursory attempt to explain how the congressional classification re-
sponded to equitable considerations." 6
Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the only reason Congress
drew the classification as it did was that the favored group had more
political influence and expertise than the disfavored group. 37 Justice
Brennan also concluded that members of the favored class had no better
equitable claim to continued dual benefits than members of the disfa-
vored group. 8'
The majority could have defeated Justice Brennan's criticisms by
holding that the Constitution permits Congress to pursue political ex-
pediency by benefiting one group at the expense of a weaker group.
13 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
134 Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-445, 88 Stat. 1305 (1975)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231u (1982)).
135 As the Court stated:
The only remaining question is whether Congress achieved its purpose in
a patently arbitrary or irrational way. . . . Congress could properly con-
clude that persons who had actually acquired statutory entitlement to
windfall benefits while still employed in the railroad industry had a
greater equitable claim to those benefits than the members of appellee's
class.
Fritz, 449 U.S. at 177-78. The Court went on to say: "It is, of course, 'constitutionally
irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision.'" Id. at 179
(quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)).
136 Justice Brennan's dissent emphasized the Court's failure to articulate the equi-
table considerations that justified the statutory classification:
It seems to me that before a court may accept a litigant's assertion of
"equity," it must inquire what principles of equity or fairness might genu-
inely support such a judgment. But apparently the Court does not demand
such inquiry, for it has failed to address any equitable considerations that
might be relevant to the challenged classification.
Id. at 194 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137 See id. at 188-94 (Brennan J., dissenting).
138 See id. at 194 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I would conclude that the members
of appellee class have as great an equitable claim to their earned dual benefits as do
their more favored co-workers, who remain entitled to their earned dual benefits under
[the statute].").
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That would have made irrelevant all dispute over the validity of the
rationale underlying Congress' classification. Like Justice Brennan,
however, the majority assumed that Congress could not draw such a
classification without some reason other than political expediency. This
assumption is consistent with a broad cross section of Supreme Court
doctrine indicating that the Constitution forbids "naked preferences."1 '
Thus, interpreting the Constitution in a case like Fritz involves
determining whether the statute violates the equal protection clause by
allocating resources inequitably. If Justice Brennan correctly perceived
the reason for the classification at issue in Fritz, that classification was
a naked preference and presumably unconstitutional. The majority did
not refute his argument. It refused to make a definitive judgment on the
constitutional issue that Fritz presented: whether equitable considera-
tions justified the classification. 4 ° Instead, it left that judgment to
Congress.
As a result, a member of Congress considering whether to reenact
the same provision could not rely on the Fritz decision to establish its
constitutionality. The constitutionality of the statute would depend on
the equitable judgment the Court refused to make. A member of Con-
gress, on the other hand, could not avoid that judgment without be-
traying her obligation to obey the law.
141
139 See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1689, 1689-90 (1984) (arguing that the constitutional prohibition of naked preferences
for one group over another could form the basis of a distinctive conception of the judi-
cial role). A preference must be clothed in "public value" before a legislature may
constitutionally enact it into law. See id. at 1695. Professor Sunstein argues that much
of the Constitution is best interpreted as an effort to prohibit "distribution of resources
to one person or group rather than another on the sole ground that those benefited have
exercised the raw political power needed to obtain government assistance." Id. at 1730.
This is a persuasive argument. As illustrated by Fritz, the Court writes, at the very
least, as though it sees such a general prohibition in the equal protection clause.
140 The Court suggested a plausible reason that could have motivated Congress.
See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 177-78 (proposing that Congress could have determined that
railroad employees with a "current connection" to the railroad industry, for whom the
Railroad Retirement Act was designed, had a greater equitable claim to benefits than
those no longer in railroad employment). However, the Court did not make a probing
inquiry into the "equity" of the situation in the usual sense of the word.
"" Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), provides an-
other familiar example of Supreme Court use of the rationality standard to avoid judg-
ment of a constitutional issue. It is less apt than Fritz for the purposes of this Article,
because it involves judicial deference to state rather than federal politicians, but it is
still instructive. The district court took the view that an Oklahoma statute, which per-
mitted only optometrists and ophthalmalogists, but not opticians, to fit old lenses to new
frames or duplicate old lenses without a prescription, was designed primarily to pro-
mote the financial interests of optometrists at the expense of opticians. See Lee Optical
of Okla., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 120 F. Supp. 128, 135 & n.16 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, proposed several possible public purposes the legislature might have intended in
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This example supports the following generalization: When courts
abstain from striking down some act of a political branch of govern-
ment out of deference, they impose a duty of constitutional interpreta-
tion on the branch of government to which they defer. A decision to
defer, by its own terms, leaves the issue to be resolved elsewhere. When
the issue is a question of constitutional interpretation, the political
branches must perform the interpretive task.
In responding to this generalization, a proponent of the judicial
monopoly assumption might argue that judicial deference does not typi-
cally entail nonjudicial interpretation. Perhaps courts resolve distinctly
legal questions, so that when they defer, they merely refuse to grapple
with nonlegal and noninterpretive "policy" questions. Leaving such
questions to the political branches of government does not threaten the
judicial monopoly assumption.142
A second response to the notion that judicial deference compels
constitutional interpretation by the branch to which the court has de-
ferred is to minimize the importance of such nonjudicial constitutional
interpretation. If judicial deference plays only a minor role in our con-
stitutional law, the judicial monopoly assumption may reflect that law
reasonably well, even assuming that deference leads to some nonjudicial
interpretation of the Constitution.
Both of these responses fail to interpret properly the role of defer-
enacting the statute. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487. He never determined, however,
what that legislative purpose in fact was. A state legislator considering a bill identical
to the statute upheld by the Court in Williamson could be quite certain that the bill
would survive judicial review, but not that it was constitutional. To keep faith with the
law, she would have to determine for herself whether the statute served some public
value or merely responded to the will of the strong at the expense of the weak.
142 This argument has played an important part in the political question debate.
Commentators who would make the political question doctrine appear aberrant must
explain the prominence of judicial deference in our legal culture as evidence of some-
thing other than division of responsibility for constitutional interpretation. Professor
Redish has done so by distinguishing between "substantive" and "procedural"
deference.
[I]t is vital to distinguish between appropriate "substantive" deference-in
which the judiciary, while retaining power to render final decisions on the
meaning of the constitutional limits, nevertheless takes into account the
need for expertise or quick action-and unacceptable total "procedural"
deference, where the court concludes simply that resort to the judiciary
constitutes the wrong "procedure," because the decision is exclusively that
of the political branches.
Redish, supra note 4, at 1048-49 (footnote omitted). Professor Henkin uses the terms
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" deference to make the same distinction. See Henkin,
supra note 3, at 599. Substantive or ordinary deference reserves all legal issues for the
courts. Procedural or extraordinary deference leaves some such issues to other decision
makers. The former is normal and nonthreatening. The latter is aberrant and
abhorrent.
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ence in our constitutional jurisprudence. When an American court de-
fers to another branch of government, it usually leaves that branch to
decide a question that is indistinguishable from those the Court con-
fronts when it does not defer. This undercuts any argument that courts
make all legal determinations and defer only with respect to nonlegal
issues. Moreover, courts defer to other branches of government with
respect to many questions having to do with broad areas of constitu-
tional concern. 143 Such sweeping deference makes implausible any
claim that deference is a peripheral or minor part of our constitutional
law.
The status of deference in our constitutional jurisprudence is
largely a by-product of the collision between constitutional law and le-
gal realism. Some discussion of this collision is essential to demonstrate
the extent to which deference entails nonjudicial interpretation of the
Constitution.
2. Legal Realism and Deference in Constitutional Law
In the 1920s and 1930s, the realists mounted a successful theoreti-
cal attack on traditional ways of justifying the exercise of judicial
power. They redefined constitutional adjudication, blurring the line be-
tween judicial and legislative decision making. As a result of their
work, we continue to view most such adjudication as a process of bal-
ancing competing interests.144 This view of adjudication makes it diffi-
cult to argue that courts defer only to political judgments concerning
policy and make all legal decisions themselves. Such an argument re-
quires a sharp distinction between legal and nonlegal issues. The realist
view of adjudication tends to collapse that distinction.
The collapse of that distinction called into question the basis of
judicial authority. The traditional view of the judicial function suggests
that judges should follow pre-existing rules, not balance competing in-
terests. 45 Accommodating divergent interests is a task for the legisla-
143 See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
14This is the impetus for the proliferation of balancing tests in both the academic
literature and court opinions.
'" As John Ely stated:
In interpreting a statute, in order to decide whether ... it conflicts with
another statute, a court obviously will limit itself to a determination of the
purposes and prohibitions expressed by or implicit in its language. Were a
judge to announce in such a situation that he was not content with those
references and intended additionally to enforce, in the name of the statute
in question, those fundamental values he believed America had always
stood for, we would conclude that he was not doing his job, and might
even consider a call to the lunacy commission.
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ture. Many jurists who understood adjudication as a balance of inter-
ests concluded that judicial deference to legislative determinations of the
proper balance should be the norm. Our courts have not followed this
conclusion wherever it led, but it has had a tremendous impact on our
constitutional law. It has contributed to the evolution of a constitutional
system that divides responsibility for interpreting the Constitution be-
tween the courts and the political branches of government. This divi-
sion leaves broad areas of constitutional law to nonjudicial develop-
ment. The argument that the judicial monopoly assumption is an
adequate account of our modern constitutional law, even if deference
entails some nonjudicial interpretation, ignores this division of responsi-
bility for interpreting the Constitution between the courts and the polit-
ical branches of government.
a. Realism and the Decline of Formalism
American legal realism was both an outgrowth of a broad intellec-
tual trend and a practical response to a political problem. 46 In the
early part of this century, progressive legal scholars were confronted
with courts that blocked a wide range of social welfare legislation' 47 as
courts argued that the impact of such regulations on common law prop-
erty and contract rights made them inconsistent with the
Constitution.'48
J. ELY, supra note 131, at 3; see also Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 805 (1983)
(arguing that liberal theory requires that judges be constrained, and identifying rules as
one type of constraint liberal theorists invoke).
'46 See E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 93 (1973) ("[T]he
realists were driven by the twin motives of intellectual discovery and social improve-
ment. They hoped to understand the legal process in a new and more useful manner,
and they hoped to see both political and legal reform flow from their discoveries."
(footnote omitted)).
14" See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554-59 (1923) (striking
down minimum wage legislation); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (striking
down legislation prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 54-65 (1905) (striking down maximum hour legislation). All of these and many
more regulations felt the judicial pruning shears during this era. Cf. Jacobson, Federal-
ism and Property Rights, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 319, 319 (1938) (arguing that during
this period constitutional arguments frequently cloaked economic interests).
14 Cf Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1987) ("[T]he
common law categories were taken as a natural rather than social construct. The status
of the common law as a part of nature undergirded the view that the common law
should form the baseline from which to measure deviations from neutrality, or self-
interested 'deals.' "). Exercises of judicial review that voided progressive legislation
were the most dramatic examples of the impact that legal conservatism had on society.
Even outside the constitutional sphere, however, progressive scholars found much to
complain about in the performance of their profession. The constitutional arguments
that offended them had common law analogues. Traditional ways of thinking about the
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Realism emerged in part because a group of progressive legal
scholars devoted themselves to destroying the theoretical foundations of
the arguments put forward by courts to justify results they found unde-
sirable. To the extent that this explains the motivations of the realists,
realism can be usefully described as their response to a political prob-
lem. It would, however, be a mistake to see realism solely as a tool of
its proponents' political agenda. The realists used the intellectual weap-
ons that they had found in the scholarly arsenal of the time to fight
their battle. The weapons they brought to bear are so much a part of
our mental apparatus that it is difficult for any of us to escape the force
of their principal conclusions.
For purposes of this Article, the most important of the realists'
conclusions concern the "bankruptcy" of formal, deductive reasoning as
a basis for legal decision making.1"" Their rejection of such reasoning
had a devastating effect on traditional arguments for the legitimacy of
judicial review. From Marbury v. Madison until recent times, formalist
assumptions regarding the nature of adjudication were the starting
point for all attempts to justify judicial review. 5
law sometimes obstruct reform of common law doctrines. See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) (discuss-
ing "the fall of the citadel of privity" in products liability).
149 Felix Cohen was fond of the bankruptcy image. See Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 823 (1935) ("Any
word that cannot pay up in the currency of fact, upon demand, is to be declared bank-
rupt, and we are to have no further dealings with it.").
... Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury set the pattern. The central ar-
gument in that opinion is one of necessity:
1) The courts have a duty to decide every case properly before them; to perform this
duty they must resolve conflicts between the Constitution and other law.
2) The Constitution is the supreme law; it must prevail in the resolution of any such
conflict. Therefore,
3) The courts must have the power to declare invalid any law inconsistent with the
Constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-79. The following
passage conveys the thrust of Marshall's reasoning:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in
opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to
a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conform-
ably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the consti-
tution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these con-
flicting rules governs the case: this is of the very essence of judicial duty.
Id. at 177. This argument suffers from a serious gap in logic. The proposition that the
Constitution should govern in case of a conflict with a mere statute does not imply that
the courts must determine for themselves whether a conflict exists. As Alexander Bickel
has pointed out, when Marshall stated that the question in Marbury was "whether an
act repugnant to the Constitution, can become the law of the land," he had already
begged the question. The real issue "was not whether an act repugnant to the Constitu-
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The Supreme Court opinions that most incensed progressive legal
scholars during the first thirty-five years of this century relied heavily
on the same formalist assumptions that supported Chief Justice Mar-
shall's argument in Marbury.15 1 When the Court struck down legisla-
tion as inconsistent with the Constitution, it typically presented its deci-
sion as a logically compelled deduction from premises provided by the
constitutional text and previous opinions construing that text.152 In the
course of attacking opinions that relied on this technique, the realists
destroyed the power of legal formalism. This left judicial review with-
out any persuasive justification and prompted a dramatic retreat from
the exercise of review. An attack directed at specific exercises of judicial
review had wounded the institution itself. 53
The realist critique of formal reasoning could only have such a
dramatic impact because it was closely allied with developments in dis-
tion could stand, but who should be empowered to decide that the act is repugnant." A.
BICKEL, supra note 44, at 3.
Marshall never tells us how courts know there is a conflict or why they should not
be bound by a congressional determination that no conflict exists. Only formalist as-
sumptions concerning the nature of adjudication can cover this flaw. Marshall's argu-
ment can make sense only if one assumes that the Constitution has a fixed, objective
meaning that is apparent to anyone with the professional training and wit to perceive
it. This assumption answers the questions Marshall failed to address. Judges know
when the Constitution conflicts with a statute because the meaning of each is self-
evident. They should determine whether there is a conflict, because they have profes-
sional expertise that lifts the scales from their eyes, permitting them to see these self-
evident truths.
"' Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), indicates that he was not as unsophisticated as the structure of his opinion in
Marbury might suggest. In McCulloch, Marshall took a broad view of the enumerated
powers of the federal government. In doing so, he relied more on "the baneful influ-
ence" of a narrow interpretation than on the constitutional text. Id. at 415. He justified
this approach with his famous statement that "we must never forget, that it is a consti-
tution we are expounding." Id. at 407. As Professor Kurland has observed, when a
judge refers to this statement, "you can be sure that the court will be throwing the
constitutional text, its history, and its structure to the winds in reaching its conclusion."
Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts "To
Say What the Law Is," 23 Akiz. L. REV. 581, 591 (1981).
152 For example, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Court articu-
lated the constitutional basis for the newly minted right to freedom of contract. It gave
no hint that the right did not merely follow from the Constitution as night follows day:
The liberty mentioned in [the due process clause] means not only the right
of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, ...
but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways
• I .to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his car-
rying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
Id. at 589.
"I See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
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ciplines other than law. The pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey,'"
the logic and mathematics of Bertrand Russell,155 and the geometry of
George Riemanni5" were all grist for the realist mill. All were elements
of a tide in western thought that swept us away from reliance on a
priori knowledge. 5 ' The attack on legal formalism had all the power
of that tide behind it.
1 58
Edward Purcell called that tide "scientific naturalism." Adherents
of scientific naturalism recognized that deduction can prove only consis-
tency of conclusions with premises; its results have no necessary rela-
tionship with truth. The choice of premises, to which logic makes no
contribution, dictates the conclusion.' 59 As Purcell defined scientific
154 See J. DEWEY, PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION (1931); see also W. RUMBLE,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 4-8 (1968) (discussing the influence of pragmatism on the
realist movement).
I'l See B. RUSSELL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY (1919).
Felix Cohen acknowledged the debt he and his contemporaries owed Russell and other
mathematicians. See Cohen, supra note 149, at 824-25.
... Riemann developed an alternative to Euclidian geometry that Einstein used to
help explain physical phenomena in his general theory of relativity. Riemann's work
was a powerful symbol of the limitations on the utility of logic. It stood for the proposi-
tion that you can use logic to prove only the consistency of your premises with your
conclusions. Non-Euclidian geometry had particular power as a symbol, because Kant
made Euclid's system the standard example of a priori knowledge. See E. PURCELL,
supra note 146, at 47-73. If one can replace even Euclid's axioms with alternative
premises and achieve useful results, it seems hard to argue that any deductive system
reaches uniquely correct conclusions.
157 A priori knowledge means "a knowledge intuitively perceived as true concern-
ing both the laws of the mind's operation and the structure of the external world." Id.
at 50.
158 Felix Cohen, one of the most articulate spokesmen for the realist movement,
was acutely aware of the intellectual debt he owed to ideas developed in philosophy,
mathematics, and science. Cohen referred to his legal methodology as "the functional
approach." Cohen, supra note 149, at 821. He identified his functional approach to
law as an extension of the revolt against metaphysical reasoning that had already taken
most disciplines by storm. Cohen asked, "[w]hat are the new directions which the func-
tional method will give to our scientific research?" Id. at 830. He responded by refer-
ring to other disciplines: "In attempting to answer this question for the field of law we
may find suggestive precedents in other social sciences." Id. He examined such prece-
dents from physics, mathematics, philosophy, anthropology and other fields. See id. at
824-34.
15 Purcell quoted Walter Wheeler Cook, a prominent realist, to illustrate this
conclusion:
The logician, he remarked, could state that "All gostaks are doshes, All
doshes are galloons." Then, quite properly and flawlessly, the logician
could deduce that "All gostaks are galloons." Although the statement was
logically unassailable, Cook commented, it proved nothing. Whether all
doshes were in fact galloons was certainly questionable; whether there
were actually any gostaks in reality was also unknown. Men could know
reality only by concrete investigation and experiment. Relying only on
logic, "we do not know what we are talking about."
E. PURCELL, supra note 146, at 89 (quoting Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13
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naturalism, it also included the following beliefs: "Absolute rational
principles did not govern or explain the universe. No a priori truths
existed, and metaphysics was merely a cover for human ignorance and
superstition. Only concrete, scientific investigation could yield true
knowledge."160
A formalist approach to constitutional adjudication is at war with
these beliefs. Such an approach is based on faith that the words of the
Constitution have a self-evident meaning that judges can know a priori
and use as a premise for deductions that control specific cases."61 As
scientific naturalism came to dominate the American intellectual com-
A.B.A. J. 303, 304-05 (1927)).
160 Id. at 3.
"" Professor Unger made a similar point powerfully in his first book. He argued
that the modem world view rejects what he calls the "doctrine of intelligible essences,"
which holds that we can perceive the essence of things a priori. See R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND PoLITIcs 32 (1975). Having rejected the doctrine of intelligible es-
sences, we cannot coherently pretend that adjudication is the process of finding meaning
in legal texts. See id. at 79-81. As Unger writes:
If there are no intelligible essences, how do we go about classifying facts
and situations, especially social facts and social situations? Because facts
have no intrinsic identity, everything depends on the names we give them.
The conventions of naming rather than any perceived quality of 'tableness'
will determine whether an object is to count as a table. In the same way,
convention rather than nature will dictate whether a particular bargain is
to be treated as a contract.
Id. at 80. He later reiterates this point more concretely:
The formalist believes that words usually have clear meanings. He adopts,
in one mode or another, Augustine's view of language as a series of names
that point to things. . . .Rules consist of strings of names, the words that
describe the categories of persons and acts to which the rules apply. To the
extent that words have plain meanings, it will be clear to what fact situa-
tions they apply ...
The view of rules and therefore of naming implicit in the formalist
thesis depends on the . . . conception of intelligible essences. To subsume
situations under rules, and things under words, the mind must be able to
perceive the essential qualities that mark each fact or situation as a mem-
ber of a particular category.
Id. at 92-93.
Unger also argues that the source of formalism's incoherence, the rejection of intel-
ligible essences, is a necessary corollary of liberalism. Liberalism, he tells us, rests on
rejection of objective values. One can only maintain the subjectivity of values at the cost
of rejecting the doctrine of intelligible essences and with it all reliance on a priori
knowledge. See id. at 79. This aspect of his argument is debatable. See R. DWORKIN,
supra note 6, at 441 n.19. Dworkin argues that liberals do not adopt "any form of
skepticism about the possibility that one way of leading one's life can be better or more
valuable than another." Id. They accept "the entirely different principle ... that
claims about the relative value of personal goals do not provide competent justifications
for regulative political decisions." Id. at 441. Whatever the merits of Unger's critique
of liberalism, his argument about the implications for formalism of denying that we can
perceive intelligible essences is difficult to refute. Since a priori knowledge remains out
of fashion, this is an important argument.
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munity during the first third of this century, the formalist approach
became vulnerable. The realists perceived this vulnerability and ex-
ploited it. They ridiculed the notion that judges could decide cases by
perceiving the meaning of the Constitution and proposed new ways to
understand the process of adjudication.162 The realists recommended
that courts face up to their responsibilities and cease manipulating
162 Felix Cohen's article, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, supra note 149, is one of the best examples of this argument. Cohen argued
that when the Supreme Court struck down a minimum wage law as inconsistent with
"due process," its reasoning revealed nothing, because it gave no concrete, nonlegal
definition of "due process." To say that the statute was unconstitutional because it
deprived plaintiffs of due process added "precisely as much to our knowledge as
Molier's physician's discovery that opium puts men to sleep because it contains a
dormative principle." Id. at 820.
Cohen used this analogy to poke fun at the traditional notion that judges could
perceive the general command of the due process clause and deduce the proper resolu-
tion of a particular case from that general command. His argument flows directly from
the assumptions of scientific naturalism. Judges cannot perceive the commands of the
due process clause because the a priori metaphysical truth one must apprehend to do so
does not exist. The clause can only have meaning if judges assign a concrete meaning to
it. They assign such meaning when they either strike down or uphold legislation chal-
lenged under the clause. Any argument that they reach their decision on the basis of the
clause's command is circular, because the clause only acquires meaning, if at all, as a
result of their decision. Because the court's own reasoning regarding the case deter-
mines the "premises" contributing to the meaning of the due process clause, it cannot
rely on logic to deductively validate the meaning it derives. Cf id. at 820 (noting that
the Supreme Court, in adjudicating due process cases, apparently believes that "what it
says three times must be true").
Cohen claimed that the pretense of reaching legal conclusions by apprehending the
meaning of a legal text and deducing its implications was pernicious. He nonetheless
had some sympathy for the use of traditional language to play a symbolic role in per-
suasion. "The law is not a science but a practical activity, and myths may impress the
imagination and memory where more exact discourse would leave minds cold." Id. at
812. Their utility aside, the myths permitted courts to avoid conscious consideration of
the real ethical and factual questions they had to resolve before deciding any case. He
suggested that the only reason for pretending was to disguise the true basis of decision
when it was not "such as could be presented without shame to the public." Id. at 820.
More than fifty years later, courts are still susceptible to the same criticism. See infra
notes 278-97 and accompanying text.
Other realists shared important attributes of Cohen's view of adjudication. Karl
Llewellyn wrote:
If deduction does not solve cases, but only shows the effect of a given
premise; and if there is available a competing but equally authoritative
premise that leads to a different conclusion-then there is a choice in the
case; a choice to be justified; a choice which can be justified only as a
question of policy-for the authoritative tradition speaks with a forked
tongue.
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1252 (1931) (em-
phasis in original); see also J. FRANK, LAW AND THE: MODERN MIND 18-20 (1930)
(arguing that certainty in the law is an illusion that we cherish because it fulfills a
psychological need).
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meaningless, metaphysical abstractions:
The realistic judge . . . will not fool himself or anyone else
by basing decisions upon circular reasoning from the pres-
ence or absence of . . .legal derivatives of the judicial deci-
sion itself. Rather, he will frankly assess the conflicting
human values that are opposed in every controversy, ap-
praise the social importance of the precedents to which each
claim appeals, [and] open the courtroom to all evidence that
will bring light to this delicate practical task of social adjust-
ment .... 163
The realists and their fellow travelers were quick to perceive the
implications of this view of adjudication for the exercises of judicial
review that offended them. If, instead of testing the validity of a statute
against the inherent meaning of the Constitution, judges performed "a
delicate practical task of social adjustment," then every offensive exer-
cise of review was subject to attack as usurpation of the legislative func-
tion. Legislatures, not courts, were supposed to balance "conflicting
human values." '164 Courts had no special claim of competence to strike
that balance.
Scholars used this argument early in the development of realist
thought to criticize cases that obstructed social welfare legislation." 5
These early attempts to apply the realist assault on formal reasoning in
criticizing episodes of judicial review drew narrow conclusions. They
claimed only that courts could not apply formal reasoning to resolve
cases of a particular kind. The focus was on cases considering the valid-
ity of social welfare legislation that changed common law rules gov-
erning the economy. Once unleashed, however, the antiformalist argu-
183 Cohen, supra note 149, at 842.
16 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
165 Progressive scholarship in the 1920s argued that any decision to strike down
social welfare legislation as inconsistent with an individual right involved striking a
balance between that right and the government's power to legislate for the general
good. A balance was inevitable, because no individual right is protected absolutely. See,
e.g., Brown, Police Power-Legislation for Health and Personal Safety, 42 HARV. L.
REv. 866, 897 (1929) ("[O]rdinary legal dogmata cease to be of assistance in the decid-
ing of cases. Instead the problem is a severely practical and political one."). Another
article, published earlier in the same decade, was even more explicit:
[I]n cases involving the industrial policy of a state or nation the measure of
due process approaches very closely to the measure of political wisdom.
The function of determining the political policy of the government belongs
to the legislature. To adopt the attitude of the court revealed in the cases
cited is equal to making the Supreme Court of the United States the su-
preme legislative body of the country.
Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REv. 338, 361-62 (1924).
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ment refused to be confined within such a narrow compass.
b. Post-Realist Conceptions of Judicial Review
The dominance of scientific naturalism in American intellectual
life generally helped the antiformalist argument against judicial review
to dominate American constitutional law. The theory that all adjudica-
tion involved making a choice between competing interests, and that the
judiciary should avoid substituting its choices in balancing these inter-
ests for that of a legislature, became a cornerstone of sophisticated con-
stitutional analysis. 66 The most outspoken proponents of this "an-
tiformalist" theory included some of our most able and influential
jurists.1
67
16 The Supreme Court applied this theory, sometimes with dramatic effect. Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), is one of the most stunning examples. In
Korematsu, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the government's decision to de-
tain Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War II. The Court merely accepted
the government's assertion that the detention responded to military necessity. See E.
RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 197 (1962) (stating that the Court acted
"without a factual record in which the justification for the act was analyzed"). Justice
Black, writing for the majority, said: "[Wie could not reject the finding of the military
authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the dis-
loyal from the loyal." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219. This reasoning was, no doubt,
partly a product of wartime hysteria. It was also, however, a product of the jurispru-
dential climate of the 1940s. In the wake of the victory over Lochner-style substantive
due process, deference was the Court's polestar.
167 The two best examples are Justice Felix Frankfurter and Judge Learned
Hand. Justice Frankfurter was so skeptical about the propriety of courts replacing a
legislative balance that he doubted the propriety of any judicial review in connection
with some of the more open-ended provisions of the Constitution, most particularly the
fourteenth amendment. He felt that our constitutional jurisprudence would have been
better if "when the Amendment first came before the Court it had concluded that it
was too vague, too much open to subjective interpretation for judicial enforceability."
See Purcell, Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 521, 533 (1976) (quoting a letter from Frankfurter to Learned Hand,
dated Feb. 13, 1958).
Taken to its logical extreme, this approach would essentially eliminate judicial
review. As Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), shows, Justice Frankfurter
was willing to carry his approach close to its logical extreme. In Dennis, Justice
Frankfurter concurred in upholding the constitutionality of the Smith Act convictions of
organizers of the Communist Party of the United States, but objected to the standard
the majority articulated. He argued that constitutional rights are never absolute. See id.
at 524 ("Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such excep-
tions would eventually corrode the rules."). Therefore, the constitutionality of the stat-
ute must depend on striking a balance between the requirements of national security
and a qualified constitutional right to freedom of speech. The Court should not disturb
the congressional determination that the requirements of national security mandated the
convictions unless it could perceive no rational basis for it:
Free-speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are not
legislators, that direct policy-making is not our province. How best to rec-
oncile competing interests is the business of the legislatures, and the bal-
ance they strike is a judgment not to be displaced by ours, but to be
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In its heyday, antiformalist theory seemed to demand almost com-
plete abandonment of judicial review. Its adherents recognized that the
Constitution's demands are never absolute. Interpretation always in-
volves choosing between competing interests. Making such choices is for
politicians, subject only to a very loose requirement that they behave
rationally. It follows that all interpretation, up to the point of irration-
ality, is outside the judicial province.
We could dismiss this extreme argument as a historical curiosity if
it were not a necessary logical consequence of premises that most of us
accept. Who would deny that formalism is an inadequate theory of con-
stitutional adjudication?""8 The realists pierced the formalist veil and
made us see choice as inherent in adjudication. But choice still seems
like a legislative function: Judicial abdication seems inescapable.
Courts have not repudiated the argument that choice is an ines-
capable part of adjudication. They have partially escaped the bonds of
the antiformalist argument by qualifying the premise that choice is a
legislative function. They have defined areas of constitutional law
within which they claim to be better suited than Congress to strike a
balance between competing interests. Thus, when a constitutional issue
involves the validity of a "suspect classification" or governmental intru-
sion on a "fundamental right," the courts are willing to replace legisla-
tive judgments with their own." 9 They show no such interest in consti-
respected unless outside the pale of fair judgment.
Id. at 539-40.
Learned Hand followed the same path to the same conclusion. Judge Hand ar-
gued that deciding whether any proposed statue would be beneficial to society "presup-
poses a choice and all choices depend upon an appraisal of the values and sacrifices to
which the contemplated action will give rise." L. HAND, supra note 33, at 37-38. He
went on to say: "I do not see how a court can invalidate [such choices] without putting
itself in the same position and declaring whether the legislature's substitute is what the
court would have coined to meet the occasion." Id. at 39. He surveyed the circum-
stances that prompted the Court to substitute its judgment for that of a legislature and
concluded that there was no way to "explain when the Court will assume the role of a
third legislative chamber." Id. at 55. Finally, he suggested that the court had no au-
thority to assume the role of the legislature, "except as a coup de main." Id.
168 See R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 278
(1973) ("Virtually all agree that to characterize a judge or lawyer's analysis as formal-
istic is seriously to condemn it.").
169 Professor Tribe notes this mode of thinking in equal protection cases:
Throughout the . . . post-1937 period, a [model of equal protection] has
offered alluring alternatives for constitutional argument, seeking to iden-
tify those fundamental aspects of social structure which should be pre-
sumptively open to all on equal terms, and those criteria of government
classification which are most suspect as likely to reflect habitual reaction
and prejudice rather than reflective understanding. . . . [I]t has been pos-
sible to give content to this model only through controversial substantive
judgments.
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tutional questions that involve economic interests.'" 0
This disparity between judicial activity on behalf of certain classes
of individuals and in favor of certain rights and judicial passivity with
respect to other constitutional issues is impossible to justify in terms of
the traditional theory underlying Marbury v. Madison. Chief Justice
Marshall gave us no basis for discriminating among constitutional
questions and taking some away from the judiciary. New theories of
judicial review sprang up to fill this void and justify the relatively nar-
row role in interpreting the Constitution that the courts defined for
themselves. Constitutional law and theory accommodated itself to a di-
vision of functions that reserved judicial interpretation of the Constitu-
tion for special circumstances and left many constitutional questions to
political resolution.
We have already seen the theoretical debate that preceded this ac-
commodation." 1 Herbert Wechsler's attempt to rehabilitate Marbury
was a rearguard action in defense of the classical theory. Alexander
Bickel put forward a new theory that still dominates constitutional
scholarship. His view that courts' constitutional function is to define
values and proclaim principles" 2 fully accounts for courts' tendency to
pay careful attention to some constitutional issues and ignore others.
Not every constitutional issue presents a fit occasion for the definition
of values and the proclamation of principles.' Almost all modern con-
stitutional theorists build on Bickel's view of the judicial role. 74 Rheto-
ric associated with the old theory, however, survived in descriptions of
L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 11-1, at 770 (footnote omitted).
1 0 See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's opinion
in Fritz). Judges are aggressive about determining and enforcing the requirements of
the first amendment, but they leave interpretation of the commerce clause to others. See
infra notes 178-96 and accompanying text. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), was the paradigm case that drove the courts back into the business of second-
guessing the legislature, at least within a defined sphere. The trend that Brown began
was foreshadowed in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938) (posing the question "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those politi-
cal processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry"). Justice Frankfurter explicitly crit-
icized footnote four of the Carolene Products decision in Dennis, 341 U.S. at 526-27
(arguing that the "imprecise words" of footnote four have engendered the belief that
statutes restricting free expression are not presumptively valid).
171 See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
172 See A. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 24-28.
173 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
174 Any theory that recommends judicial activity on behalf of certain preferred
values descends from Bickel's work. Most modern constitutional theorists defend some
such position. See e.g., J. ELY, supra note 131, at 87-88 (arguing for representation-
reinforcing review); M. PERRY, supra note 98, at 91-145 (arguing for non-interpretive
review with respect to human rights issues).
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the judiciary's role vis-a-vis these special areas. The judicial monopoly
assumption arises out of that rhetoric. In sum, during the first half of
this century, lawyers responded to a broad intellectual trend by re-
jecting the view that courts could decide the constitutional validity of
legislation without replacing legislative judgments with their own. This
led many of our most thoughtful jurists to wash their hands of most
constitutional adjudication, choosing instead to defer to the legislature.
In the last 35 years, courts have reoccupied a defined part of the consti-
tutional realm, but this part is much smaller than the whole. Outside of
this defined area, Congress and the President exercise almost complete
freedom to interpret the requirements of our fundamental law.
3. Post-Realist Constitutional Practice
The preceding history shows why the argument that courts defer
to political judgments of policy, but decide legal questions for them-
selves, is untenable. The realists left us without a sharp distinction be-
tween legal and nonlegal decisions, a distinction that is essential to that
argument.175 The same history also shows why one cannot dismiss def-
erence as a peripheral part of our constitutional law. The realist view
of adjudication led the courts to withdraw from important aspects of
constitutional decisionmaking. Examples will help clarify both these
points.
"' Ronald Dworkin has spent much of his career trying to restore the distinction
between the legislative and judicial functions to prerealist clarity. He has argued that
judicial decisions should be motivated only by principle, not by policy:
[J]udges neither should be nor are deputy legislators, and the familiar as-
sumption, that when they go beyond political decisions already made by
someone else they are legislating is misleading. It misses the importance of
a fundamental distinction within political theory, which I shall now intro-
duce in a crude form. This is the distinction between arguments of princi-
ple on the one hand and arguments of policy on the other.
Arguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that the
decision advances or protects some collective goal of the community as a
whole. . . . Arguments of principle justify a political decision by showing
that the decision respects or secures some individual or group right. ...
I propose . . . the thesis that judicial decisions in civil cases, even in
hard cases. .. , characteristically are and should be generated by principle
not policy.
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058-60 (1975).
Dworkin's powers of persuasion are considerable, but his view of adjudication has
not yet replaced that with which the realists left us. Formalism is more difficult to
replace than Dworkin would have us believe. See R. UNGER, supra note 161, at 92
("[T]he destruction of formalism brings in its wake the ruin of all other liberal doc-
trines of adjudication.").
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a. Distinguishing Legal and Nonlegal Decisions
If deference means that the same issue courts would have resolved
had they asserted themselves gets resolved politically, the argument that
judicial deference reserves all legal issues for judicial resolution is un-
tenable. In post-realist American practice, that is precisely what defer-
ence means. As a result, judicial deference to Congress or the executive
branch typically leaves a constitutional issue to nonjudicial resolution.
A distinction among such exercises of deference can only be one of de-
gree.176 The more sweeping the deference, the broader the field it
leaves for nonjudicial interpretation. 177 Comparing the questions courts
decide in an area of constitutional law in which they are active with
similar issues they leave to political resolution in an area in which they
are passive will make this point concrete. Such a comparison reveals the
problems with any attempt to distinguish deference that leaves ques-
tions of interpretation to political resolution from deference that does
not.
The first amendment has been the basis of a great deal of judicial
activity. Doctrine in the area of restrictions on dissemination of danger-
ous ideas exemplifies the courts' approach toward constitutional issues
when they exercise their power to resolve them.
Most discussions of the first amendment proceed as though first
amendment doctrine began with Justice Holmes' opinion in Schenck v.
United States.'78 That opinion represents a break with what went
before, but what went before is instructive. Nineteenth-century free
speech analysis turned on an a priori determination of whether the con-
duct restrained was "speech" within the meaning of the first amend-
ment. Courts distinguished between speech and abuse thereof, and they
left legislatures free to restrain the latter. "Opinions constantly reiter-
176 Although Professor Redish distinguished between substantive deference that
reserves legal issues to the courts and procedural deference that leaves such issues to
nonjudicial resolution, see supra note 142, he, too, seems to recognize that the distinc-
tion is largely a matter of degree: "It might be argued that authorizing the judiciary to
engage in 'substantive' deference effectively allows the legislative and executive
branches the same freedom of operation that I have opposed in rejecting . . . 'proce-
dural' deference." Redish, supra note 4 at 1049 n.96. At one point Redish argues that
some decisions presented as substantive deference are procedural in all but name, see
id. at 1037-39, but he seems oblivious to the threat this insight poses to his distinction
between substantive and procedural deference. He merely indicates that, although the
distinction may be one of degree, it is important because "the fundamental purposes of
judicial review" are served as long as the judiciary maintains a "floor of protection."
Id. at 1049 n.96. As Redish himself has noted, however, even substantive deference
commonly removes that floor. See id. at 1037-39.
"I Some of the deference our courts practice sweeps very broadly indeed. See in-
fra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
178 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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ated that the First Amendment . . . [did] not protect 'license' or the
'abuse' of speech."17' 9 Casting the issue in these terms had the virtue of
suppressing any question regarding the propriety of having judges re-
solve the question.
Realism made this approach to the first amendment as implausible
as it made every other effort to interpret the Constitution on the basis
of a priori knowledge. Justice Holmes' opinion in Schenck conformed
first amendment doctrine to the realist view of adjudication. According
to Justice Holmes, the constitutional question concerned the extent to
which the speech at issue posed a threat.' Constitutionally, Congress
could prohibit any speech "of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils that Con-
gress has a right to prevent.""8 Under this test, first amendment analy-
sis became a process of striking a balance between the danger posed by
the speech at issue and the constitutional value of freedom of speech.
This "clear and present danger" standard has had a checkered ca-
reer. Some justices have even sought to revive the nineteenth-century a
priori approach.' 2 But the structure of the Supreme Court's analysis of
restraints on dangerous speech has remained what Schenck made it.' 8
17' Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514,
523-24 (1981).
180 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. Schenck concerned the constitutionality of convic-
tions under the Espionage Act of 1917 for obstructing military recruiting by circulating
a pamphlet that attacked the moral and constitutional validity of conscription. See id. at
48-49.
181 Id. at 52.
182 Justice Douglas sought to distinguish simple speech, which the Court should
protect, from "speech brigaded with action," for which government-imposed restrictions
are appropriate. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Douglas' distinction was an effort to resurrect the a priori ap-
proach. Justices also rely on an a priori approach when they distinguish between ordi-
nary speech and behavior that is "mainly conduct and little speech" in order to describe
behavior the government can regulate. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27
(1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding the case to involve a clear example of con-
duct that may be regulated, rather than protected speech).
18I Since Brandenburg, the Court has struck down governmental restraints on
dangerous speech, see Hess v. Indiana, 414, U.S. 105, 109 (1973) ("[S]ince there was
no evidence ... that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce immi-
nent disorder, those words could not be punished by the State on the ground that they
had a 'tendency to lead to violence.'" (emphasis in original) (quoting Hess v. State, 260
Ind. 427, 429, 297 N.E.2d 413, 415 (1973) (quoting Whited v. State, 256 Ind. 386,
391, 269 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1971)) (emphasis deleted by Indiana Hess court)) except
speech that is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action," Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; see also Hess, 414 U.S.
at 108 (quoting the same language from Brandenburg); 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK &
J.N. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 20.15, at 64 (1986) (stating that Hess "indicates that the Court is serious and literal
in its application of the test proposed in Brandenburg"). This formula has not, how-
ever, changed the nature of first amendment inquiry. It merely expresses a judgment
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For our purposes, the important point is that the validity of a govern-
mental restraint on dangerous speech depends on whether the risk the
speech poses outweighs the constitutional value of free speech."" It was
once respectable to argue that courts should leave this determination to
legislatures."l 5 It is now broadly accepted, however, that such a deter-
mination is one for the courts.
It is difficult to distinguish such a determination regarding the
"dangerousness" of speech from the judgments courts avoid when they
consider cases asserting that Congress has enacted legislation beyond
the scope of its constitutional powers. Commerce clause doctrine pro-
vides a convenient illustration of this.
In the early part of this century, courts decided commerce clause
questions by determining whether what Congress sought to regulate
was commerce s6 or affected commerce directly. 8 ' The assumption un-
about the point at which the danger of the speech outweighs the values embodied in the
first amendment. In other words, both Schenck and Brandenburg prescribe balancing.
The only difference is that Schenck directs courts to balance on an ad hoc basis and
Brandenburg seeks to constrain them by balancing at the outset. This difference may
be significant for some purposes, but for purposes of this Article, the important point is
that some sort of balancing is involved in deciding first amendment cases.
John Ely put forward the interesting argument that there is a significant differ-
ence between the approach in Brandenburg, which he terms an "unprotected
messages" approach, and that in Schenck, which he terms a "specific threat" approach.
See J. ELY, supra note 131, at 110. Ely indicated that an "unprotected messages"
approach is much more likely to lead courts to protect speech in difficult times than an
ad hoc approach such as the "clear and present danger" test. See id. at 105-16; see also
Gunther, Learned Hand and The Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 721-22 (1975) (discussing the
relationship between the "clear and present danger" standard, and the "incitement"
standard). Ely argues that, to protect speech, judges must define limited categories of
unprotected speech and strike down any limitations on speech that fall outside the cate-
gories. Even if this argument were persuasive, nothing in Ely's analysis indicates that
the analytical structure of the Court's approach to the first amendment would be radi-
cally different from Justice Holmes' approach in Schenck.
184 It is a reflection of the hold scientific naturalism has on our minds that we
have difficulty conceiving of the issue in any other terms.
'85 Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 495 (1951),
shows this. See supra note 167. The view that the legislature's determination as to the
need for controlling speech should be authoritative once commanded a majority of the
Court. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (affirming a convic-
tion under a state syndicalism act for membership in a communist political party);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925) (affirming a conviction for criminal
anarchy for publishing a socialist newspaper).
186 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (striking down a
child labor law on the ground that it regulated manufacturing and "the making of
goods and the mining of coal are not commerce").
187 The Court took this approach in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), striking down part of the National Industrial Recovery
Act on the ground that it exceeded the commerce power. The Court held, among other
things, that the act reached transactions that did not affect interstate commerce directly.
See id. at 546; see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) ("The
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derlying this approach is familiar: Judges can distinguish a priori be-
tween commerce and noncommerce and between direct and indirect
effects.
The twentieth century intellectual climate proved just as inhospi-
table to these distinctions as it did to the distinction between speech and
abuse thereof. Like first amendment doctrine, commerce clause doctrine
departed from the a priori approach, with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.'8 8 marking the turning point. The Supreme Court rejected
arguments based on its earlier, categorical exclusion of "manufactur-
ing" from "commerce."' 18 9 Instead, the Court held that Congress had
the power to protect commerce against any threat, including intrastate
labor unrest. It noted, however, that the congressional power over in-
trastate activities was not unlimited:
[Ilf [intrastate activities] have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exer-
cise that control. Undoubtedly the scope of this power...
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them...
would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local. . . . The question is necessarily
one of degree. 9
The Court's approach in Jones & Laughlin Steel makes congres-
sional power under the commerce clause turn on whether or not Con-
gress is regulating activities with a sufficiently "substantial" relation to
interstate commerce. Whether the relation is substantial depends on
striking the proper balance between the state and federal interests in-
word 'direct' implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed shall operate
proximately-not mediately, remotely, or collaterally-to produce the effect. It connotes
the absence of an efficient intervening agency or condition.").
188 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In this case, the Court considered the constitutionality of
the NLRA. The plaintiff claimed that Congress lacked the power to regulate industrial
relations between a manufacturer and its employees. This argument rested on a series
of cases following the a priori approach that had defined commerce to exclude
manufacturing.
189 Compare id. at 34, 40 (The Court rejected "the proposition that manufactur-
ing in itself is not commerce" because "the fact that the employees here concerned were
engaged in production is not determinative. The question remains as to the effect upon
interstate commerce of the labor practice involved.") with United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1895) (discussing the need to distinguish "commerce" from
"manufacture" in order to maintain the distinction between the state's "police power"
and the federal power to regulate interstate commerce).
190 Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
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volved, and subsequent cases under the commerce clause show that the
courts will not strike this balance. 9' They leave that task to the politi-
cal branches of government.
The issue the Court considers inappropriate for judicial resolution
in commerce clause cases is startlingly similar to the question it reserves
to itself in first amendment cases. Both involve determining the extent
to which federal power can intrude upon a constitutionally protected
value, speech or federalism, without violating the Constitution. One
cannot designate the question courts decide in first amendment cases as
"legal" and the question they avoid in commerce clause cases as "non-
legal" without relying on a meaningless tautology: A question is legal if
resolved authoritatively by a court; it is nonlegal if resolved by any
other decisionmaker. Either both questions involve constitutional inter-
pretation or neither does.
b. The Importance of Judicial Deference
Commerce clause doctrine also provides a concrete example of the
extent to which judicial deference is an important part of our constitu-
tional law.'92 That example is a serious embarrassment for anyone who
would argue that deference is a peripheral enough part of that law to
be compatible with the judicial monopoly assumption. The Court's per-
missive approach to ascertaining the scope of congressional commerce
power makes the political branches of government responsible for de-
veloping one of the central aspects of our constitutional law. It leaves
the federal government free to displace state law and to ignore state
interests in any area remotely related to economic activities, without
191 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the question
whether crops grown for home use have a substantial effect on commerce is a matter
for Congress to determine); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964) (upholding Congress' authority to determine that a hotel can have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce and is therefore subject to the nondiscrimination
requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) (same, for a restaurant).
192 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), which I have already dis-
cussed, represents another sweeping deferential doctrine. For a discussion of judicial
deference to the legislature, see supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text. Courts
defer to almost any legislative determination that an interference with financial inter-
ests is supported by the constitutionally required justification. Thus, a claim of uncon-
stitutional interference with such interests is most unlikely to get a hearing in court.
The political branches of government are left to define the scope of the Constitution's
protection for property. But see Allied Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 248-51
(1978) (striking down economic regulation under the contract clause over a vigorous
dissent by Justice Brennan); Kmiec & McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to
the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 544-45 (1987) (assert-
ing that the Burger Court partially revived the contract clause by raising the standard
of review and invalidating statutes under the clause for the first time since the 1940s).
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fear of judicial intervention. In effect, the Court refuses to play any
significant role in defining the relationship between the states and the
federal government. If one overlooks a single, short-lived backsliding
episode, 193 the Court has been remarkably consistent about staying
above the fray on federalism questions. Because federal-state relation-
ships are a major area of constitutional concern,"' this judicial aloof-
ness leaves the political branches of government with broad responsibil-
ity for developing our constitutional tradition. 9 '
193 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845-52 (1976) (holding
that the commerce clause does not permit Congress to require state governments to
comply with certain provisions of the FLSA with respect to certain employees). Al-
though the decision was subsequently overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), Justice Brennan's dissent in National League
of Cities gives abundant evidence that the case was anomalous. See National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 856-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Scholarly criticism of the National
League of Cities opinion reinforced this view. See, e.g., Alfange, Congressional Regula-
tion of the "States Qua States": From National League of Cities to EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 215, 216-17 (calling scholarly criticism of National League
of Cities justified); Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the
Tenth Amendment, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 162 (stating that the National League of
Cities opinion shattered the previous orthodox interpretation of the tenth amendment);
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1192 (1977) (stating that the
National League of Cities opinion is an "outrageous" presentation of a "falsification"
of the only considerations that might support the result). The concept that the political
branches of government are the guardians of federalism is so ingrained in our legal
culture, see Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rble of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 559 (1954), that one prominent scholar explained National League of Cities as a
"cue" to Congress that it must judge its "own actions to see if they conform to the
limits and restraints placed on them by the Constitution," P. BOBBITT, CONSTrru-
TIONAL FATE 192 (1982).
194 Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia includes an eloquent description of federal-
ism's place in our constitutional order:
In our federal system, the states have a major role that cannot be pre-
empted by the National Government. As contemporaneous writings and
the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification
of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding of federalism.
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to ensure that the
important role promised the States by the proponents of the Constitution
was realized. . . .The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sov-
ereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States would serve as
an effective "counterpoise" to the power of the Federal Government. ...
[Bly usurping functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the constitutionally
mandated balance of power between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment, a balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 571-72 (Powell, J., dissenting).
195 Donald Morgan recognized the extent of congressional responsibility for con-
stitutional interpretation. He noted that "there are innumerable actions which Congress
has legal power to take which fundamental principle would nevertheless counsel
against." D. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 36. Such actions raise "'broad' questions of
interpretation." Id. He also noted that "[c]ourt reinterpretation of clauses granting fed-
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Deference as American courts practice it leaves important catego-
ries of constitutional issues to nonjudicial resolution. As a result, no
theory of American constitutional law can maintain that the judiciary
has a monopoly on constitutional interpretation without ignoring too
much of the relevant data. To say that the judiciary should have such a
monopoly is to state a utopian ideal. Nothing could be further from the
reality of our constitutional practice."' 6 Any claim that the political
question doctrine fails to fit that practice because it seeks to define lim-
its on the scope of judicial review is nonsensical.
IV. THE NORMATIVE CLAIM FOR EXPANSIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND OUR CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
Critics of the political question doctrine are not completely dis-
armed by a showing that exceptions to the rule of judicial review are
consistent with our constitutional tradition. A critic who reads Profes-
sor Dworkin with care might argue that we should adopt the judicial
monopoly assumption despite its poor fit with that tradition. Dworkin
tells us that an interpretation that performs poorly along the dimension
of fit may nonetheless be the "right" interpretation if it has enough
appeal as a matter of political morality.197 In keeping with this view,
some critics use the cataclysmic consequences assumption as part of an
implicit argument that sound political morality requires absolute judi-
cial control over constitutional interpretation, even if we must strain to
make such absolute control fit our constitutional tradition. 98 Such an
eral powers to Congress, and to some degree of those concerning executive-legislative
relations, has eliminated many questions of literal interpretation and converted them
into broad questions." Id. at 341. With respect to such questions, Congress "faces the
task of independently searching constitutional principles." Id.
196 Professor Redish is one of the few proponents of the judicial monopoly as-
sumption who seems to recognize this. He sees the inconsistency between that assump-
tion and commerce clause doctrine, but he is willing to argue that this inconsistency
means the Supreme Court has gotten the doctrine wrong. In a recent article, he and a
coauthor propose that the Supreme Court take a far more active role in "interpreting
and enforcing the Constitution's federalism provisions." Redish and Drizen, Constitu-
tional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1987). The commerce clause is the "federalism provision" to which they
direct most of their attention.
9 7 As Dworkin has stated:
[A]ny plausible theory of interpretation . . . will call for some cross influ-
ence between the level of fit at which the threshold is fixed and the sub-
stantive issues involved. If an interpretation of some string of cases is far
superior "substantively" it may be given the benefit of a less stringent test
of fit for that reason.
Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 172 (1982).
198 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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argument can be summarized as follows: The alternative to universal
judicial review is lawlessness; lawlessness is to be avoided at all costs;
we cannot, therefore, tolerate any exceptions to judicial review. 99
A. Defending the Cataclysmic Consequences Assumption
There are at least two arguments that can be used to justify the
cataclysmic consequences assumption. First, one could argue that it fol-
lows from the correct definition of law that only rules courts enforce
impose legal obligations on the political branches of government. This
might give substance to the charge that the alternative to judicial review
is lawlessness. Second, one could argue that the behavior of the political
branches of government is, in fact, lawless in the absence of judicial
supervision. If Congress and the President pay no attention to constitu-
tional concerns that are unlikely candidates for judicial vindication,
then the cataclysmic consequences assumption accurately reflects our
system.
1. Postulate 1: Only Judicially Enforceable Rules Impose Legal
Obligations on the Political Branches
Professor McCormack seems to take the first approach.200 He sug-
gests that positivist jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that the politi-
cal branches of government can have no obligations under the Constitu-
tion except those obligations the courts enforce.2"1 He repeatedly argues
that without judicial enforcement, constitutional provisions are merely
"hortatory," not legal at all.2" 2 Professor McCormack's use of the
199 The flaw in this argument is its first premise. Lawlessness is not the necessary
alternative to judicial review. Far less is at stake when the courts exempt certain issues
from judicial review than the critics suppose.
10 See McCormack, supra note 3, at 634.
201 "At least with regard to constitutional constraints, law must exist apart from
the enforcers, because there can be no such thing as unenforceable law. To this degree,
we are all positivists . . . ." Id.
.2 As Professor McCormack states:
The notion that the Constitution imposes duties that are not enforceable
may be in keeping with some modern strands of legal philosophy. But it
markedly changes the Constitution from a positive check on government
into a set of hortatory directives that "We the People" may be quite inca-
pable of enforcing.
Id. at 596 n.8 (citation omitted). McCormack recognizes that a provision of the Consti-
tution that the courts will not enforce may retain some "debate value", but he suggests
that this value is not significant. He says that although members of Congress can still
argue that an unenforceable provision should control, "nobody is likely to take the
argument very seriously if the Court has already declared the provision to be nonen-
forceable." Id. at 599. This assumption is, at least, debatable. See infra notes 211-13
and accompanying text.
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phrase "the concept of law" in his title implies a reference to H.L.A.
Hart.20 3 This is as close as he comes to citing specific jurisprudential
support for the argument that legal obligation can arise only from judi-
cially enforceable rules. Professor Hart's theory, however, does not sup-
port Professor McCormack's argument.
One of Professor Hart's many contributions to positivist jurispru-
dence was a sophisticated description of the normative aspect of legal
obligation. °4 His positivist predecessors had depicted law as "orders
backed by threats given by one generally obeyed" and not accustomed
to obeying any other authority. 05 This view is often associated with
John .Austin.206 For Austin, legal obligation arises from the threat of
sanctions that lie behind a legal command. His critics pointed out that
his definition of law contains no normative element; it matches a ban-
dit's extortion as well as the most benign acts of the most representative
legislature. 07 Professor Hart refined the positivist view of law to ac-
count for the normative element in our understanding of legal obliga-
tion and thus distinguish between these situations. Professor Hart's the-
ory of legal obligation is more complex than Austin's.0"
Professor Hart argues that societal understandings about what
rules we are obligated to obey-not the mere threat of force-are the
basis of legal obligation. This view of law implies no necessary connec-
tion between organized sanctions and legal obligation. Professor Hart
made this point explicit, stating that "once we free ourselves from the
203 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
204 See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 19-20 (1977).
205 H.L.A. HART, supra note 203, at 24.
206 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 204, at 21.
207 As Dworkin observed:
[C]ritics began to realize that Austin's analysis fails entirely to account for,
even to recognize, certain striking facts about the attitudes we take toward
"the law." We make an important distinction between law and even the
general orders of a gangster. We feel that the law's strictures-and its
sanctions-are different in that they are obligatory in a way that the out-
law's commands are not.
Id. at 18-19.
20' Professor Hart's theory may or may not be more useful, depending on the
purpose to which one puts a theory of obligation. As a definition of that which is
essential to a legal system, Austin's model remains at least defensible.
Austin's model of law is an effort at definition. It claims that the essence
of law is coercion and that other features are not essential. . . . This
claim that law is coercive is compatible with the existence of a normative
attitude among some people; indeed, even the idea of an order backed by a
threat entails at least one normative (uncoerced) attitude on the part of the
person or persons doing the ordering.
P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 26 (1984). Thus, Austin could respond to Hart that a
normative attitude is "no more essential to law than cushions or rockers are essential to
chairs." Id. at 22.
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• . . conception of law as essentially an order backed by threats, there
seems no good reason for limiting the normative idea of obligation to
rules supported by organized sanctions."209 Judicial enforcement is just
one kind of organized sanction. If Hart's theory provides no basis for
making sanctions a prerequisite of obligation, it cannot support an ar-
gument that only rules enforced by courts can give rise to legal
obligation.210
Even if Professor Hart is wrong and some coercive sanctions are
essential to law, it does not follow that every legal rule must be enforce-
able in court before it can bind the government. Judicial enforcement of
restrictions on the political branches of government is hardly a coercive
sanction. Ultimately, "[t]he judiciary . . . has no influence over either
the sword or the purse. . . . It may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judg-
ments."21' The commands of a court are themselves merely "hortatory"
when addressed to Congress or the President. If coercive sanctions are
essential to law, then no law binds the political branches of govern-
ment, regardless of whether the courts stand ready to enforce constitu-
tional restrictions on their activities.
The judiciary can, however, focus public disapproval on unlawful
acts by the political branches of government. This capacity to mobilize
public opinion may give it some leverage against the other branches of
government, but there is no reason to think lawless acts by government
officials can never provoke public outrage in the absence of a court
ruling. Government officials are typically under pressure from public
opinion to obey the law with or without judicial involvement.
United States v. Nixon 21 provides an example. Professor Redish
uses this case to illustrate the political risks to government officials of
ignoring judicial decisions concerning the requirements of law. He
points out that "President Nixon could not have seriously considered
ignoring the Court's conclusion that he must supply his tapes to Con-
gress, because the political costs would have been too high."21 This
conclusion seems right. Ultimately, however, the political costs to
Nixon of retaining the tapes would likely have been the same even if
the Court had not become involved. Disobeying the Court would prob-
"I H.L.A. HART, supra note 203, at 213.
110 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
211 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
212 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
211 Redish, supra note 4, at 1054. In fact, the Court concluded that Nixon had to
supply his tapes to the special prosecutor. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713. This detail does
not, however, detract from Redish's point.
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ably have led to impeachment; refusing to deliver the tapes in the ab-
sence of any court order could easily have had the same result.
There is nothing so fearsome about a court order that we should
assume government officials are much more wary of violating the Con-
stitution when the courts may scold them for it than when public out-
rage is the only sanction. This discredits any attempt to distinguish be-
tween binding provisions of the Constitution and those that are merely
"hortatory" based on the degree of judicial enforcement they enjoy.
2. Postulate 2: The Behavior of the Political Branches is Lawless
in the Absence of Judicial Supervision
Even if judicial sanctions are not logically necessary to ensure law-
ful behavior of government officials, the cataclysmic consequences as-
sumption might reflect the reality of American constitutional practice.
The political branches of our government might behave as though the
requirements of the Constitution are coextensive with the constitutional
requirements that courts enforce. If congressional and executive branch
officials disregard all constitutional values that the courts will not im-
plement, the cataclysmic consequences assumption is valid.
This concession does not open much of a window to the propo-
nents of that assumption. There is little evidence that the political
branches of government concern themselves with the Constitution only
under threat of judicial enforcement. In fact, there is substantial evi-
dence to the contrary.
Scholars rarely bother to construct an argument that the political
branches of government are constitutionally irresponsible.214 When they
do, however, their arguments typically begin and end with the criticism
that the political branches of government do not behave like the
judiciary.
21 5
214 Bald statements that they are, however, are common. See, e.g., Fiss, The Su-
preme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-
10 (1980) ("Legislatures ... are not ideologically committed or institutionally suited
to search for the meaning of constitutional values, but instead see their primary func-
tion in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the people-what they
want and what they believe should be done.").
215 Dean Brest notes that "Congress possesses many of the resources necessary for
informed constitutional decisionmaking." Brest, Congress as Constitutional Deci-
sionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 98 (1986).
He argues, however, that it uses those resources badly. The thrust of his argument is
that Congress is not set up sufficiently like a court. "Although it would be unreasona-
ble to expect Congress to act just like a court, a comparison with adjudication high-
lights some of Congress' weaknesses." Id. Brest uses this argument to support his point
that Congress is not responsible enough for constitutional matters, that it cannot prop-
erly contradict the Supreme Court's resolution of a constitutional question: "Until and
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Judge Abner Mikva made an argument of this sort in a recent
article. He drew a sweeping conclusion:
[C]onstitutional decisions, if they are being made at all, are
being made by the Supreme Court. While constitutional
rhetoric occasionally finds its way into the legislative history
of a statute . . . for the most part the legislators are moti-
vated by a desire to enact any particular piece of legislation
that fills the perceived needs of the moment.216
Judge Mikva based this conclusion on three examples of congressional
deliberations concerning constitutional issues.21 7 He conceded that Con-
gress debated each of the issues at some length, but that did not prompt
him to qualify his conclusion.
Judge Mikva's first example was the extension of the provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local government employ-
ees.1 Judge Mikva complains that Congress did not "conduct an inde-
pendent constitutional review"21 of the legislation, and thus failed to
consider the constitutional concerns that led the Supreme Court to
strike down part of the FLSA in National League of Cities v. Usery.220
He acknowledges, however, that "opponents of the extension protested
that it represented an 'unjustified intrusion upon areas of state sover-
eignty.' "221 This is a constitutional objection; indeed, it is precisely the
rationale of the majority opinion in National League of Cities.222 After
admitting that Congress considered this constitutional issue, Judge
Mikva can preserve the utility of his example only by arguing that
those who raised the sovereignty objection claimed merely that the in-
trusion on the states was unwarranted, not that it was unconstitutional.
This is a verbal quibble. It merely proves that members of Congress in
unless Congress develops systematic and trustworthy procedures of constitutional deci-
sionmaking, Congress may not counter the Court's decisions ... ." Id. at 103. I have
no dispute with this point. My thesis is that the argument concerning congressional
irresponsibility cannot support the broader point that the political branches of govern-
ment are not to be trusted with any aspect of constitutional interpretation.
218 Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C.L. REV. 587, 606 (1983).
217 See id. at 590-91.
218 See id. at 591-93 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 255, 260 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)).
219 Id. at 593.
220 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
221 Mikva, supra note 216, at 592 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND
LABOR, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AMENDMENTS OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 232, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (minority views)).
222 See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842 (stating that "there are limits
upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty").
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debate do not express themselves in exactly the same terms employed
by judges in opinions.
Judge Mikva's other examples also fail to support his conclu-
sions.2 28 In each case he describes a vigorous congressional debate that
aired relevant constitutional issues, and concludes with the non sequitur
that the debate demonstrates Congress' constitutional irresponsibility.
2 2'
His most damaging allegations are that Congress failed to reach the
same result that the Supreme Court reached later,225 that the lower
courts had already reached,2 26 or that he prefers. 27
113His other two examples are congressional consideration of the legislative veto
provision in amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act and enactment of section
3576 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. See Mikva, supra note 216, at 593,
600. In examining the legislative veto matter, Judge Mikva quoted Senator Schmitt,
who argued for the legislative veto in spite of Consumer Energy Council of America v.
FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 448-51 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding the legislative veto to be un-
constitutional). Senator Schmitt criticized the court's opinion as grounded in "an ideal-
ized conception of the separation of powers that is neither historically accurate nor has,
until now, been actually applied to overturn an act of Congress." Mikva, supra note
216, at 597-98 (citing 128 CONG. REc. S2578 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1982) (statement of
Sen. Schmitt)). Judge Mikva also cites statements that urge the Senate to find the veto
an unconstitutional substitute for genuine congressional supervision of administrative
agencies, see id. at 599 n.62, yet he concludes: "On the matter of constitutionality, the
debates, to the extent they took place, are filled with self-serving conclusory congres-
sional discussion, the value of which is not easy to determine," id. at 600.
In discussing his third example, Judge Mikva acknowledges that the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary relied heavily on extensive expert testimony concerning the
constitutionality of the Organized Crime Control Act. See id. at 601. He also acknowl-
edges that this testimony played a role in congressional debate. See id. at 603. Judge
Mikva nonetheless regards his examples as support for his sweeping conclusions. See
id. at 606.
224 Not everyone seems to agree with Judge Mikva. See Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REv. 707, 708 (1985) (maintaining
"that Congress can perform an essential, broad, and ongoing role in shaping the mean-
ing of the Constitution").
22 With respect to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Judge Mikva seems upset that
Congress reached a result different from the Court's result in National League of Cit-
ies. He says that National League of Cities "came as a complete surprise to Congress."
Mikva, supra note 216, at 591. Of course, as Louis Fisher pointed out, "[it also came
as a surprise to constitutional scholars and to the four dissenting Justices." Fisher,
supra note 224, at 733.
22 Judge Mikva's criticism of congressional deliberations regarding the legislative
veto seems to be related to Congress' failure to follow a D.C. Circuit decision. See
supra note 223.
117 Judge Mikva's reaction to Congress' decision to enact the Organized Crime
Control Act seems colored by his vehement opposition to the bill as a Representative.
As a Member of the House, Representative Mikva made caustic contributions to the
debate: "This bill is another dreary episode in the ponderous assault on freedom ....
[I]t rips off large chunks of the Constitution . . . .[It is] a repressive shotgun which
shoots down innocent and guilty with equal diffidence." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4007, 4076-77 (dissenting views of Rep. Conyers, Rep. Mikva, and Rep. Ryan).
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B. Evidence of the Constitutional Responsibility of Government
Officials
Nobody has outdone Judge Mikva in arguing that the political
branches of government ignore constitutional values. The absence of a
better demonstration of political irresponsibility should, by itself, raise
doubts about the political behavior alleged to warrant the cataclysmic
consequences assumption. But there is also substantial affirmative evi-
dence showing the falsity of this view of political behavior.
The continued vitality of the states as governmental entities pro-
vides the most compelling evidence that the political branches of the
government do not routinely trample constitutional values. Congress
and the President act as guardians of the federal system. For fifty years
the judiciary has not supervised the manner in which they perform that
function.2 ' Although the scope of federal activities has grown dramati-
cally, the states have survived, and states appear to be in no danger of
extinction. 29 New forms of federal and state cooperation have arisen
that preserve a role for the states even in some areas of intense federal
activity.230 Anyone arguing that the judicial whip is the only thing that
keeps the political branches of government from discarding all constitu-
tional restraints will have difficulty explaining the continuing health of
federalism in the United States.
An example of congressional concern for state prerogatives arose
during the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 1 By 1973, the
Advisory Committee had prepared a draft of proposed rules that the
Supreme Court had approved and forwarded to Congress. 22 The adop-
2 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
229 Stuart Eizenstat argued recently that the "states are, more dearly than at any
point in the last 50 years, the centers of innovation and creativity, while policy making
in Washington is an utter shambles." Eizenstat, Adapting Federalism within the Pre-
sent Constitutional Structure, in ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, Is CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM NECESSARY TO REINVIGORATE FEDERAL-
ISM? 13, 13 (1987).
220 For example, the states administer federal grant-in-aid programs. This has
allowed each state some discretion in shaping the programs as they apply within that
state's borders. Thus, states have been free to implement some form of work or job
training requirements for mothers receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
Innovations of this kind have been models for proposed federal legislation. See S. 1511,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Family Security Act of 1987); H.R. 1720, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987) (Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987).
231 Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
app. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
22 Under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2702 (1982), the draft was to
take effect on July 1, 1973 unless Congress acted to forestall this result. Congress did
just that, passing a statute requiring an affirmative vote of both houses to bring the new
rules into effect. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
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tion process was derailed, principally because of the draft's provisions
concerning privileges. These provisions would have created a uniform
body of federal privilege law applicable in federal court even in actions
based on state law. Some members of Congress had substantive objec-
tions to the scope of the protection the draft extended to certain privi-
leges.233 The most important objection to the draft, however, was that it
displaced too much state law.2" 4 Congress redrafted the proposed rules.
The new draft, which ultimately took effect, specifically directed fed-
eral courts to adopt state rules of privilege in cases applying state
law. 2
35
The Senate Judiciary Committee report on the redrafted version
of the rules makes clear the rationale for this provision:
Federal law should not supersede that of the States in sub-
stantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling reason.
This reflects the view that in civil cases in the Federal
courts, where a claim or defense asserted is not grounded
upon a Federal question, there is no Federal interest in the
application, or in its resolution, of a uniform law of Federal
privilege strong enough to justify departure from State
policy.
236
This argument would be less significant if it reflected a judicially
enforceable limit on the power of Congress to displace state law with
federal rules of evidence. The Advisory Committee had concluded,
however, that the Supreme Court would erect no barrier to imposing
federal rules of privilege even in cases applying state law. The Com-
mittee read Hanna v. Plumer"7 to hold that any arguably procedural
233 See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 694 (1974)
("The narrowness of the husband-wife privilege provided and the virtual elimination of
the doctor-patient privilege were thought to threaten personal privacy. The refusal to
recognize any sort of newsman's privilege was seen by many as a threat to the freedom
of the press." (footnotes omitted)).
234 See Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 154-58 (1973) (statement of Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg); id. at 171-73 (state-
ment of Charles R. Halpern and George T. Frampton, Jr., on behalf of the Washing-
ton Council of Lawyers); id. at 246 (testimony of Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge,
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit); id. at 330-331 (testimony of Robert W.
Warren, Att'y Gen., Wis., and President-Elect, Nat'l Assoc. of Att'ys Gen.); id. at 495
(statement of Stuart H. Johnson, Jr., practicing lawyer).
23I See FED. R. EVID. 501 ("[I]n civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of a witness . . . shall be determined in accordance with State law.").
"I S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 7051, 7053 (footnote omitted).
237 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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rule is valid and applicable in such cases. 2  Any rule governing the
extent to which a court can compel a witness to give testimony is at
least arguably procedural. Congress reasonably could have concluded
that the states had no judicial shield against assertion of federal power
to displace state privilege law in federal court. 39
Despite the judicial precedent that would have supported congres-
sional approval of the proposed rule, such a reallocation of power from
the states raised a constitutional issue, which Congress resolved in con-
stitutional terms. It did so by refusing to arrogate power to itself by
enacting a uniform federal rule, preferring instead to preserve the
states' prerogatives to define such rules. Constitutionally responsible be-
havior of this sort is inconsistent with the assumption that the political
branches of government will always ignore any constitutional restraints
on their power that the courts are not prepared to enforce.
Other aspects of the political branches' constitutional behavior give
further evidence that their respect for the Constitution is not entirely
dependent on prodding from the judicial oracle. They have reached
complex constitutional accommodations with each other without any as-
sistance from the judiciary. In doing so they have shown a sensitivity to
constitutional concerns that contradicts the cataclysmic consequences as-
sumption-an assumption that tells us that such concerns carry no
weight in nonjudicial deliberations. Constitutional accommodations by
the political branches prove that they can both give weight to constitu-
tional concerns and assess their relative weight with skill.24°
For example, courts played no role in the process by which Con-
gress and the President reached a careful balance of constitutional con-
cerns in connection with legislative vetoes.241 Such vetoes are a unilat-
eral legislative action, which seems to be an affront to the Executive
238 See FED. R. EvID. 501 advisory committee's note ("Regardless of what might
once have been thought to be the command of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins as to obser-
vance of state created privileges in diversity cases, Hanna v. Plumer is believed to locate
the problem in the area of choice rather than necessity." (citations omitted)). If Hanna
itself did not reach such a broad holding, Hanna in combination with Sibbach v. Wil-
son, 312 U.S. 1 (1941), did. See Ely, supra note 233, at 739 ("The case the Committee
should have cited was Sibbach, which .. seems a fairly clear precedent for the valid-
ity of the proposed privilege provisions.").
239 This exactly matches the courts' approach to the scope of most congressional
powers, such as the commerce power. See supra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
240 The observation that this skill may reflect only a fine balance of political
power between Congress and the Executive should not affect this argument. The bur-
den of the cataclysmic consequences assumption is to show that the political branches
do not take constitutional concerns into account when they reach decisions. If those
concerns are balanced in their deliberations, it is of no importance that political reality
caused this to occur. The important thing is that it did occur.
21 See L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 162-70 (1985); Fisher, supra note 224, at 734-39.
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and may undermine separation of powers. Nonetheless, some flexible
legislative device, like this veto, for maintaining control over the admin-
istrative state seems essential for effective separation of powers under
modern conditions. Many, if not most, commentators find the political
accommodation of these conflicting considerations superior to the one
the Supreme Court ultimately reached.242
There are neither jurisprudential nor empirical grounds for con-
cluding that the alternative to judicial enforcement of all constitutional
norms is lawlessness. 4" This does not mean that our system would nec-
essarily be better if the judiciary abstained from consideration of all
constitutional issues. It means only that the system need not be vastly
worsened every time the judiciary abstains from consideration of a con-
stitutional issue. This conclusion discredits the strongest normative. ar-
gument for the proposition that the judicial monopoly assumption is the
best interpretation of our constitutional tradition despite its poor fit
with that tradition.
V. TOWARD A MEANINGFUL DEFINITION OF POLITICAL
QUESTIONS
Critics of the political question doctrine have failed to make out a
case for abandoning the doctrine as inconsistent with the basic princi-
ples of our constitutional law. Thus far, we have seen that our tradition
242 See, e.g., Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A
Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455, 465 (1977) (stating that "[tihe legis-
lative veto is an efficient means of resolving the tension between the executive's need for
elasticity of action and the legislature's need to check that action"); Strauss, Was There
a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Deci-
sion, 1983 DuKE L.J. 789, 791-92 (noting that the legislative veto is useful as "an
instrument of the continuing political dialogue between President and Congress, on
matters having high and legitimate political interest to both"); Tribe, The Legislative
Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 27 (1984)
(referring to the Court's "lack of restraint in destroying 'an important if not indispen-
sable political invention' ").
243 The argument that the political branches are not always lawless in the absence
of judicial supervision does not imply that their decision-making processes are flawless.
There is an extensive literature focusing on deviations from our idealized view of the
legislative process as majoritarian deliberation. See, e.g., Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A
Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1567, 1579-84 (1988) (discussing problems caused by the influence of
special interest groups on the legislative process). Perhaps the most obvious "distrac-
tion" is the power of special interest groups to warp legislative deliberations. Important
as these defects are, they do not deflect my attack on the cataclysmic consequences
assumption. Indeed, Congress' responsiveness to special interests is the primary reason
it can be trusted to protect certain constitutional norms. For example, the power of
state governments as a special interest group in the politics of the federal government
gives Congress most of its sensitivity to federalism. See Wechsler, supra note 193, at
559.
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does not mandate that courts resolve all constitutional issues. Nor is the
prospect of nonjudicial resolution of some constitutional issues so fright-
ening that judicial resolution is always desirable. It remains to address
the critics' argument that neither courts nor commentators have given
the political question doctrine any meaningful content.
A. Traditional Definitions of "Political" Questions
The criteria that Justice Brennan identified in Baker v. Carr2
4"
seem hopelessly inadequate for the task of distinguishing between cases
courts should dismiss on political question grounds and cases for which
judicial review is routine.245 Specifically, a "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment"24 of an issue to another branch of govern-
ment cannot be decisive. It is difficult to formulate an argument that
the text mandates a commitment of any issue we would otherwise con-
sider "legal" to the political branches of government. Moreover, the
Supreme Court rejected the strongest argument of that sort in Powell v.
McCormak.24" Nor can a lack of "judicially discoverable ... stan-
dards"'24 prevent review without casting doubt on all the Court's con-
troversial decisions interpreting the due process and equal protection
clauses.2 49 The other criteria Justice Brennan offered for identifying
political questions are equally inadequate for similar reasons;25° they
all seem to apply to many cases in which judicial review is the norm.
24 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
245 See id. at 217 (quoted supra text accompanying note 21).
246 Id.
247 395 U.S. 486 (1969). For a discussion of Powell, see supra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text; see also Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (1986) ("It is
difficult to imagine a clearer case of 'textually demonstrable constitutibnal commitment'
of an issue to another branch of government. . . than the language of Article I, section
5, clause 1 . . . ." (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1359 (1987).
248 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
214 Professor Redish made this point in replying to Alexander Bickel's argument
that the political question doctrine should permit courts to avoid issues that are "in-
tractab[le] to principled resolution." A. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 184. Redish wrote:
"If we were really to take seriously the 'absence-of-standards' rationale, then we would
once again be proving considerably more than most of us had intended, for a substantial
portion of all constitutional review is susceptible to the same critique." Redish, supra
note 4, at 1047.
250 In light of all the policy decisions courts make, it is hard to imagine a policy
determination "of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. It
is also hard to imagine what would make one instance of overturning the decision of a
coordinate branch of government more disrespectful than another. To say there is "a
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision," id., is just another way of
saying there should be no judicial review, without giving any reason for that result.
Finally, whenever the judiciary overturns a political decision, there will be conflicting
pronouncements, but because the judicial pronouncement is authoritative, the conflict
should not be too embarrassing.
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The justifications offered by the commentators have not been nota-
bly more effective. We have already seen the rationale Professor Bickel
put forward to support the political question doctrine25 ' and Professor
Redish's response to it.25 2 Professor Bickel's work remains the most in-
fluential academic defense of the political question doctrine. As Profes-
sor Redish points out, however, Professor Bickel's version of the politi-
cal question doctrine seems vulnerable to the same criticisms that
undercut Justice Brennan's version.
The difficulty of finding a meaningful distinction between political
questions and other constitutional issues evaporates if we replace the
judicial monopoly assumption with a better interpretation of our consti-
tutional practice. The remainder of this Part will describe such an in-
terpretation and show how it helps give the political question doctrine
meaningful content. It will also defend the proposed interpretation by
arguing that it both fits our tradition and comports with political
morality.
B. A "Shared Responsibility" Model of Constitutional
Interpretation
Part III of this Article argued that the judicial monopoly assump-
tion fails to fit our practice by showing that we make important excep-
tions to the rule of judicial review. As that argument suggests, a better
model of our practice would recognize that our system divides responsi-
bility for constitutional interpretation between judicial and nonjudicial
decision makers. To be complete, therefore, this alternative model must
define the sphere within which each actor is responsible for constitu-
tional interpretation.
Developing this alternative model in detail is beyond the scope of
this Article, but it is not difficult to describe the rough outline of the
sphere within which the courts consider themselves responsible for con-
stitutional interpretation. Protecting oppressed individuals from abuses
of government power is the core of that sphere.253 Courts see a special
21 See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
253 See United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(stating that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... may call for a...
more searching judicial inquiry"); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 127-28, 169-70 (1980) (arguing that judicial review is primarily
for preserving individual rights against the government); J. ELY, supra note 131, at
73-104 (discussing Supreme Court protection of the right of individuals to participate
in representative government); Redish, supra note 4, at 1058 ("I would surely concur
that the Court's most important function in engaging in judicial review is the protection
of individual rights."); Monaghan, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REv. 296, 308 (1980)
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role for themselves in guaranteeing individual rights, and they severely
limit their activities in constitutional areas that give them little opportu-
nity to play that role.2 '" Thus, they make no attempt to affect the con-
stitutional balance between the state and federal governments.255 More-
over they avoid most issues concerning the proper balance of power
between Congress and the President.256 This pattern of abstinence re-
flects a judgment that the political branches of government can balance
responsibly the factors relevant to resolving questions of federalism and
separation of powers.257 In sum, the courts abstain from judicial review
in any case that does not involve their core function if the political
branches of government seem worthy of being trusted with the issue
presented by the case.
Interpreting our system as dividing responsibility for constitutional
exegesis in this manner resolves the difficulty of finding a meaningful
distinction between political questions and issues appropriate for judi-
cial resolution. The former are different from the latter because they
fall outside the sphere of responsibility for constitutional interpretation
that the courts claim for themselves. Classifying issues as political ques-
tions is one way that courts can mark the boundaries of that sphere.258
Courts need not treat every issue that falls outside their sphere as
(reviewing J. CHOPER, supra) ("Choper's view that the central role of the Court is to
protect individual liberties is a widely shared premise of modem constitutional
theory.").
I" Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (em-
ploying a rational basis test in reviewing economic legislation) and supra notes 131-41
& 188-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's passive approach to economic
questions) with Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4 (suggesting the Court apply
heightened scrutiny when necessary to protect insular minorities) and supra note 253
and accompanying text (noting the widespread view that the primary responsibility of
courts is to protect individual rights).
2" See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985);
supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text; see also Wechsler, supra note 193, at 558-
60 (explaining that the Framers did not emphasize the function of the Court in check-
ing national authority).
258 See Monaghan, supra note 253, at 302 (stating that a "nonjusticiability ap-
proach [to separation of powers cases] has strong roots in the actual pattern of our
constitutional history"); infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text (discussing separa-
tion-of-powers cases). But see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (finding the
assignment of executive functions to a legislative officer to be an unconstitutional
breach of separation of powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (finding uncon-
stitutional a unicameral legislative veto of administrative action).
'57 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552 ("State sovereign interests. . . are more properly
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than
by judicially created limitations on federal power."); Wechsler, supra note 193, at 558
("[Tihe national political process in the United States. . . is intrinsically well adapted
to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the states.").
258 This argument does not imply that all decisions invoking the political question
doctrine are correctly decided. I am defending the far narrower point that not all cases
relying on the political question doctrine are wrongly decided.
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a political question; they have other devices for marking the boundaries
of their primary sphere of responsibility. For example, courts have
marked federalism issues as outside that sphere by defining congres-
sional powers so broadly that every legal challenge to federal intrusion
on state prerogatives is futile.259 Nonetheless, the political question doc-
trine has played an important role in delimiting judicial responsibility
for constitutional interpretation.
The political question doctrine has had a particularly important
effect in separation-of-powers cases. 60 Goldwater v. Carter" "1 illus-
trates this effect; it also reveals the basis for the judicial abstinence that
the political question doctrine represents.262 In Goldwater, Justice
269 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
260 This is also the area in which the doctrine can probably be most useful to
courts deciding future cases. Other justiciability doctrines, such as standing, have also
been useful in separation-of-powers cases, because many of these cases can only come
before the courts in nontraditional forms. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (holding that present and former members of the
Armed Forces Reserve lack standing to challenge the Reserve membership of Members
of Congress as violating the incompatability clause of the Constitution).
Nothing in my argument commits me to the absolutism with which Dean Jesse
Choper argued against judicial review of cases involving federalism and separation of
powers. See J. CHOPER, supra note 253. My argument is narrower: I do not claim that
such review can never be appropriate, only that it is often inappropriate. The courts
should use the political question doctrine to dismiss cases in which review is
inappropriate.
The general scheme of divided responsibility for constitutional interpretation sug-
gests meaningful ways to distinguish cases in which review is appropriate from those in
which it is not. This scheme, unlike Dean Choper's, leaves room for judicial review of
a separation-of-powers claim in cases having some special need for judicial guidance.
There might be such a need, for example, if Congress and the President were engaged
in a confrontation over some separation-of-powers question. Thus, a case challenging a
presidential decision to wage a "covert" war in defiance of a congressional ban on
funding for that war may be appropriate for judicial resolution, even if a challenge to
the constitutionality of waging war with congressional cooperation, but without a for-
mal declaration, is not. Compare Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 568 F. Supp.
1236 (D.D.C.) (holding nonjusticiable a private citizen's challenge to the U.S. Govern-
ment's use of private land in Honduras for military purposes), affd on other grounds,
724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd on reh'g, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
bane), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985), affd on other grounds, 788
F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) with Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing nonjusticiable a challenge to the constitutionality of the Vietnam War, in the ab-
sence of a formal congressional declaration of war, because of congressional cooperation
in the prosecution of the war). Dean Choper concedes that "[an attractive argument
may be made" that in the event of an "escalating" clash between the political branches,
"the Court should intercede to preserve our constitutional equilibrium." J. CHOPER,
supra note 253, at 298. But he dismisses the significance of his concession by arguing
that such clashes hardly ever occur. In the unlikely event that such a clash were to
occur, he says, the judiciary could do little to defuse it. See id. at 298-308. He may be
right, but it seems to me that the judiciary can play a role in many situations short of
the apocalyptic confrontation Choper envisions.
261 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
262 Goldwater involved a challenge to President Carter's decision to terminate a
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Rehnquist and three other justices stated that a challenge by members
of Congress to the President's unilateral cancellation of a treaty
presented a political question. Justice Rehnquist justified his conclusion
in part by stating that Congress had resources for protecting itself from
overreaching by the Executive and did not need judicial assistance.26S
Justice Rehnquist concluded that there was no justification for includ-
ing such a case within the sphere of judicial constitutional responsibil-
ity.264 This conclusion exemplifies the meaning I attach to the political
question analysis.
mutual defense treaty with Taiwan without consulting Congress. Justice Rehnquist
concurred in the decision to vacate and remand the case, but, in a statement joined by
three other justices, argued that the question whether the Constitution requires such
consultation prior to termination was nonjusticiable. He reasoned that no express lan-
guage in the Constitution covered this question, and no hard and fast rule would be
appropriate: "In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the ter-
mination of a treaty, and the fact that different termination procedures may be appro-
priate for different treaties . . . the instant case in my view 'must surely be controlled
by political standards.'" Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1975)).
263 See id. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist
distinguished Goldwater from Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), by arguing that Congress "has resources available to protect and assert its in-
terests." Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Because the private litigants
in Youngstown had no such resources, it was appropriate for the Court to act on their
behalf in that case, but remain passive in Goldwater. This touches on the same con-
cerns that motivated Justice Powell, who concurred in Goldwater on the ground that
the case was not ripe for review. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). He indicated that the case could have become ripe for review "[i]f the Congress,
by appropriate formal action, had challenged the President's authority to terminate the
treaty." Id. at 1002 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, both Justice Pow-
ell and Justice Rehnquist indicated that the Court should refrain from deciding Gold-
water, because Congress had the power to protect itself against the President's assertion
of executive authority, but had chosen not to exercise that power. This argument has
strong roots in our constitutional tradition. In James Madison's words, each branch of
government "has the constitutional means and personal motives to resist the encroach-
ments of the other." THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 321-22 U. Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961).
26 In Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit held
that it could not decide whether congressional cooperation with the Executive in prose-
cuting the Vietnam War was sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of con-
gressional authorization to make war. The court explained that "there are no intelligi-
ble and objectively manageable standards by which to" reach a decision on that point.
Id. at 1043. There was, however, nothing unique about Orlando in this respect. Most
constitutional adjudication proceeds in the absence of "objectively manageable stan-
dards." The court's unwillingness to decide what form congressional authorization to
make war must take cannot be merely a result of its fear of making a subjective choice.
The court also must have decided that there was no pressing need for it to make such a
choice, as Congress was in an excellent position to make that choice for itself. It ex-
pressed a choice by cooperating with the President in the prosecution of the war and
refraining from any protest about the absence of a formal declaration of war. Thus, the
court determined that Orlando fell outside its proper sphere of activity. The court used
the political question doctrine as the legal clothing for that judgment.
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Certainly, as the critics have pointed out, the traditional justifica-
tions for the political question doctrine do not make this meaning clear.
If the courts adopt the approach recommended here, however, they
should have little difficulty formulating better justifications in future
cases.
To this point, I have argued indirectly, by criticizing the alterna-
tive interpretation of judicial review, that courts should adopt a divided
responsibility approach. It remains to argue for this approach directly.
Doing so entails applying the same tests that Parts III and IV applied
to the judicial monopoly assumption: 1) Does it fit our constitutional
tradition and 2) Does it provide a good justification for that tradition as
a matter of political morality?
C. Examining the Shared Responsibility Assumption's Fit with Our
Constitutional Tradition
The argument that the proposed divided responsibility assumption
fits our constitutional tradition is the mirror image of the argument that
the judicial monopoly assumption does not.2"5 Every aspect of our tra-
dition and practice that is incompatible with that assumption fits com-
fortably with the model of shared responsibilities described above. The
numerous "misfits" between our tradition and the judicial monopoly
assumption identified in Part III are ample evidence of a good fit be-
tween the divided responsibility model and our tradition.
D. The Normative Appeal of the
Shared Responsibility Assumption
Articulating a normative defense for the model of shared responsi-
bility requires greater attention. Even if one rejects the cataclysmic con-
sequences assumption, the judicial abstinence required by the model is
troublesome. If judges leave a particular constitutional issue to others,
they may have to accept a resolution of that issue that they consider
wrong. Why should a judge confine herself within a system that forces
her to accept such errors?
1. Traditional Defenses of Judicial Abstinence
Most commentators who have tried to answer this question focus
on the threat of public reaction to judicial activism. The courts must
not try to do more than the people will permit them to do. If courts do
265 See supra notes 86-196 and accompanying text (Part III).
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not limit their own role, the people will limit it for them. By limiting
themselves, the courts can ensure that their most important functions
are not impaired. Dean Jesse Choper advanced the most elaborate ar-
gument of this sort.26 He argued that the judiciary needs to conserve
its "institutional capital" for the protection of individual rights, which
it can do by abstaining from consideration of cases that raise issues of
federalism or separation of powers. 6 7 This argument has drawn more
than its share of criticism. Some commentators argue that the courts
have no need for such circumspection. The courts are firmly en-
trenched; they need not worry about public rejection. They can do as
they please without fear of reprisals. In fact, their power grows as they
exercise power.268
Other commentators claim that Dean Choper overestimated the
extent to which the courts' "capital" is transferable from one context to
another. 2 9 They suggest that the public, when it cares about the
Court's activities at all, cares only about the result the Court reaches.
Citizens rejoice at an outcome with which they agree; they sometimes
react with anger to decisions with which they disagree; most of the time
they do not react at all. There is no reason to believe that refusing to
decide categories of cases that do not raise strong emotions in most peo-
ple will help the Court survive negative reaction when it reaches a re-
sult many people find abhorrent.
These criticisms may not demolish Dean Choper's defense of judi-
cial abstinence, but they undermine it. The courts have offended large
segments of the American people without provoking a revolt. Moreover,
it seems implausible to suggest that the Court would be better insulated
from the reaction to Roe v. Wade270 if it refused to decide Bowsher v.
Synar.27' What follows is an attempt to outline a better defense of judi-
cial abstinence, one that is not so vulnerable to those criticisms.
266 See J. CHOPER, supra note 253, at 169 (arguing that the Supreme Court
should refrain from deciding cases having to do with separation of powers and federal-
ism because its activity in those fields had "expended large sums of institutional
capital").
217 See id.
268 See J. ELY, supra note 131, at 48 ("[Pjublic persons know that one of the
surest ways to acquire power is to assert it.").
26' See, e.g., Redish, supra note 4, at 1058 ("It is by no means intuitively clear
that the Court could effectively 'store' its capital with the public for unpopular individ-
ual rights decisions by avoiding review in non-individual rights cases."); Monaghan,
supra note 253, at 301 ("[N]o solid basis exists for believing that the Court's modern
federalism decisions contribute anything significant to the grievances [felt against the
Court].")
270 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2-1 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see also infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Bowsher).
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2. An Alternative Rationale for Judicial Abstinence
Our constitutional law is a battlefield for two incompatible myths.
One is the "myth of politics," which tells us that political decisions are
legitimate because they reflect the will of the people. The other is the
"myth of law," which tells us that the courts ensure that all the other
constitutional players obey the rules of the game. The problem is that
any attempt by the courts to see that Congress and the President obey
the rules of the game denigrates the myth of politics by taking decisions
away from the representatives of the people. Conversely, any limit on
the power of the courts to do so denigrates the myth of law.272
Our remote predecessors used formalism to reconcile these myths,
but it is no longer possible for most of us to believe that courts can
enforce the rules of the game against the political branches of govern-
ment without assessing the substantive merits of their decisions in the
process.2 7 3 As a result, no logical accommodation of these myths is
possible.
27 4
Instead, we accommodate them in emotional terms. Courts are ac-
tive in those areas of constitutional law in which their mythology has
the greatest rhetorical power. They are inactive in areas in which their
272 As Bickel observed:
Democratic government under law-the slogan pulls in two opposed di-
rections, but that does not keep it from being applicable to an operative
polity. If it carries the elements of explosion, it doesn't contain a critical
mass of them. Yet if the critical mass is not to be reached, there must be
an accommodation, a degree of concord between the diverging elements.
A. BICKEL, supra note 44, at 27-28.
27I Commentators have tried to construct models of judicial review that permit
courts to avoid such assessments. Every such model, however, has failed to achieve its
purpose. The most prominent example is John Ely's model of judicial review. Ely
proposed that courts should police the political process to ensure that it is open and that
it does not disadvantage certain groups out of prejudice. See J. ELY, supra note 131, at
74-75. Focusing on the legislative process, he said, would permit courts to abstain from
assessing the substantive merits of the outcomes that it produces. See id. at 101-04.
Identifying a flawed process, however, is impossible without considering the merits of
the challenged outcome. See Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131,
141 (1981) (arguing that laws based on stereotypes injure the dignity of individuals);
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE
L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) ("[lIt is not difficult to show that the constitutional theme of
perfecting the processes of governmental decision is radically indeterminate and funda-
mentally incomplete."). To design models that permit courts to exercise judicial review
without assessing the substantive merits of the challenged legislation is like designing
perpetual motion machines-exciting, but futile. See Brest, supra, at 141-42 (stating
that process-based theories "are to constitutional theory what the perpetual motion ma-
chine is to science").
274 See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradic-
tions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063 (1981) ("I
shall argue that the controversy over the legitimacy of judicial review in a democratic
polity . . . is essentially incoherent and unresolvable.").
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mythology is weak and the myth of politics is strongest.7 5 The rhetori-
cal appeal of the myth of law is at its strongest in cases involving alle-
gations of government oppression of the powerless, 278 and courts have
been most active in cases with some link to that paradigm. The rhetori-
cal power of that myth is weakest in cases involving the proper balance
of power between state and federal government or between the legisla-
tive and executive branches of the federal government. The political
process seems capable of resolving most such issues satisfactorily with-
275 This way of resolving a legal question may be unsettling to anyone schooled in
a scientific world view. Our intellectual training makes us yearn for the kind of cer-
tainty in legal reasoning that formal logic seems to produce in geometry. Once we
accept that courts should vary their involvement in constitutional interpretation without
a logical basis for doing so, we have abandoned the quest for such certainty. But
nonlogical, rhetorical solutions to legal problems seem natural once we adopt the view
that law is a social discourse. That view makes our legal practice a branch of rhetoric.
Professor White describes both rhetoric and law as grounded in a kind of knowledge
that is "not scientific or theoretical but practical, experiential." See J. WHITE, Rhetoric
and Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON
THE RHETORIc AND POETICS OF THE LAW 40 (1986). He describes this knowledge
and how we use it as follows:
This knowledge is . . . not reducible to rules . . . rather it is the knowl-
edge by which we learn to manage, evade, disappoint, surprise, and please
each other . . . . This knowledge is not provable in the scientific sense,
nor is it logically rigorous. For these reasons it is unsettling to the modern
scientific and academic mind. But we cannot go beyond it, and it is a
mistake to try. In this fluid world without turf or ground we cannot walk,
but we can swim. And we need not be afraid to do this-to engage in the
rhetorical process of life-notwithstanding our radical uncertainties, for
all of us already know how to do it. By attending to our own experience,
and that of others, we can learn to do it better if we try.
Id. This view of law has many antecedents. It is particularly in debt to the work of
Chaim Perelman. See generally C. PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC (1982)
(discussing the reasoning that underlies values). For a critique of Perelman's work that
argues that his "new rhetoric" rests on apologetic assumptions about law and its place
in society, see P. GOODRICH, LEGAL DIscOuRsE 111-124 (1987).
" The hearings on Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court illustrate the
variable power of the myth of law. Judge Bork made the mistake of arguing in print
that the myth of politics should prevail in almost every case, regardless of the sort of
issue the case presents. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Judge Bork argued that courts could not legitimately
strike down a law making use of contraceptive devices criminal, see Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), any more than they could strike down an antipollution
ordinance, because there was no distinction between the two issues:
Every clash between a minority claiming freedom and a majority claiming
power to regulate involves a choice between the gratifications of the two
groups. . . . Why is sexual gratification nobler than economic gratifica-
tion? There is no way of deciding these matters other than by reference to
some system of moral or ethical values that has no objective or intrinsic
validity of its own . . ..
Bork, supra, at 9-10. The widespread hostility that this position generated is a measure
of the strength the myth of law retains. It also indicates how context-specific that
strength is. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
19881
172 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
out judicial intervention. The issues themselves are too technical to sup-
port effective rhetoric about the judicial role in preserving our
liberties."'
The essence of judicial duty is to decide cases in accord with the
law. Our constitutional law mandates accommodation of both constitu-
tional myths. Deciding cases in accord with the rule of law entails
maintaining the delicate balance between those two myths.27 A judge
who refuses to give the myth of politics its due is refusing to perform
her duty. It follows that judges should maintain their pattern of absti-
nence whether or not that pattern helps shield them from a real danger
of backlash.
Two recent Supreme Court opinions having to do with separation
of powers indicate the force of this moral argument. In each case the
Court went to great lengths to avoid confronting the choices underlying
its decision. Instead, it relied on formalism, presenting its decisions as
compelled by the clear meaning of the Constitution. The Court's use of
such a tattered fig leaf in each case indicates that the members of the
majority were ashamed of making choices and unwilling to leave them
naked.17 9 If the Court cannot present its decision without shame, it
must be because the justices sense a breach in their duty to respect the
myth of politics.280
INS v. Chadha s1 provides one example. In Chadha, the Court
considered the constitutionality of provisions for a one-house legislative
veto of administrative actions. It concluded that such vetoes were legis-
lative action, which require bicameral congressional action and presi-
277 But see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Flederal overreaching under the Commerce Clause
undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of power between the States and the
federal government, a balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties.").
278 This obligation to respect the myths has little to do with the relationship of
either to reality. A judge is obligated to respect the myth of politics, not because it
reflects the true nature of Congress and the Executive, but because any competent in-
terpretation of our constitutional law must demand such respect. A great deal of the
discussion about the extent to which our political process lives up to its representative
ideals is, therefore, irrelevant to the concerns of constitutional theory. See, e.g., Parker,
The Past of Constitutional Theory-and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 248-254
(1981) (criticizing the "process-oriented" theories of Choper and Ely).
279 This inference is reinforced by the observation that the Court knows full well
how to approach a separation of powers issue forthrightly when it has no cause to be
ashamed of the choices it makes in doing so. See infra note 294 (discussing Morrison v.
Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988)).
280 Cf Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 526 (1987) (sug-
gesting that formalism "serves as a proxy for a functional approach for Justices per-
haps unwilling to trust . . . themselves . . . with the difficult and contextual analyses
that functionalism requires.").
281 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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dential approval. The Court began its analysis by observing that
"[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe
and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive
in the legislative process." ' It went on to conclude that Congress
could only perform legislative functions bicamerally and with present-
ment to the President.2 " It saw no question whether the veto at issue
involved a legislative function.B4
In dissent, Justice White castigated the majority for ignoring the
practical justifications for the legislative veto. He stressed the need for
such a flexible device in order to permit Congress to retain some control
over administrative agencies in an age of sweeping delegations of legis-
lative authority to such agencies.285 Justice White was the first of many
to voice this criticism of the Court's reasoning. A number of academics
provided variations on the same theme-that the Court relied on a
brand of formalism that was discredited a generation ago. 8 6
Bowsher v. Synar2 7 provides a similar example. In Bowsher, the
Court considered the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
deficit reduction plan.288 According to the Court, the plan assigned cer-
tain executive responsibilities to the Comptroller General.2 9 Because
the Comptroller General is a legislative officer, subject to removal by
Congress, the Court held the plan unconstitutional: Separation of pow-
ers would not permit the legislative branch to assign an executive func-
tion to itself.2 90 Once again, Justice White's dissent took the lead in
criticizing this reasoning.29i Unlike the majority, "his major goal [in
separation of powers cases] is to police the concept of checks and bal-
282 Id. at 945.
283 See id. at 954-55, 958.
284 See id. at 958.
285 See id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting) ("Without the legislative veto, Congress
is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to refrain from delegating the necessary author-
ity . . . or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking function to the Executive
Branch and independent agencies.").
288 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 242, at 794-801 (criticizing the Chadha Court
for "eschewing" functional analysis and merely "asserting" that the act of Congress at
issue was a legislative one requiring bicameral action and presentment to the Presi-
dent.); Tribe, supra note 242, at 17 (speculating that "Chadha represents a return to a
form of constitutional exegesis that simply proclaims intelligible essences more than it
purports to explain or justify philosophical or practical premises").
2a' 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
288 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. IV 1987 &
West Supp. 1988)).
28 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27.
280 See id.
211 See id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's view of
separation of powers as "distressingly formalistic").
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ances, not to become formalistically preoccupied with elaborating defi-
nitions of the separation theme."'2 92 Once again, others have followed
suit in commentary.29s
The consensus of these criticisms is that the Court chose to employ
a discredited mode of reasoning rather than assessing the comparative
weight of the competing constitutional concerns at issue in Chadha and
Bowsher. The Court should not be driven to such an unsatisfactory
choice by an overly expansive view of its role in our constitutional sys-
tem. If it cannot confront an issue directly, it should not resolve it,294 as
Dean Choper suggested.295 This is advice the Court has heeded in some
292 Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation
of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 485 (1987).
293 See, e.g., Banks & Straussman, Bowsher v. Synar: The EmergingJudicializa-
tion of the FISC, 28 B.C.L. REv. 659, 677-79 (1987) (criticizing the Bowsher major-
ity's characterization of the Comptroller General's duties as reminiscent of the argu-
ment by assertion in Chadha); Strauss, supra note 280, at 520 (arguing that, although
Justice White had the better approach in Bowsher, emphasizing function over the for-
malism of the majority, he did not carry through this argument as fully as was
required).
94 The Supreme Court established in Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988),
that it can face at least some separation-of-powers issues directly. In Morrison, the
Court considered the constitutionality of the special prosecutor provisions of the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The Act provides
for appointment of independent counsel to investigate and prosecute certain government
officials. The Act charges a specially constituted court with responsibility for ap-
pointing such counsel and limits the power of the President to remove them. The Court
rejected a separation of powers challenge to this arrangement without making much
effort to hide behind a veil of formalism. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620-21. The
Court recognized that the Act restricted executive action in some respects, but indicated
that the restriction was not enough to justify striking down the provision and frustrat-
ing the congressional effort to ensure disinterested investigation of alleged executive
branch misconduct. See id. at 2621-22. In reference to the Act's limitations on presi-
dential removal of independent counsel, the Court said:
[T]he congressional determination to limit the removal power . . . was
essential, in the view of Congress, to establish the necessary independence
of the office. We do not think that this limitation as it presently stands
sufficiently deprives the President of control over the independent counsel
to interfere impermissibly with his constitutional obligation to ensure the
faithful execution of the laws.
Id. at 2620.
The Morrison opinion does not, however, indicate that since it decided Bowsher
and Chadha, the Court has become comfortable with altering politically engineered
solutions to separation of powers questions. In Morrison, unlike Bowsher and Chada,
the Court left the other branches of government as it found them. Thus, in Morrison,
the Court had no occasion for the shame that seems to have led it to shroud its actions
with formalism in Bowsher and Chada. Ascertaining whether or not the Court can
properly reject a politically engineered solution without resorting to formalism, must
await a future case or controversy.
29 See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
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instances29 ' and would do well to heed in others. The political question
doctrine is one tool it can use to put that advice into practice.297
CONCLUSION
In recent years, most commentators who have considered the polit-
ical question doctrine have attacked it either as an anomoly with no
proper place in American jurisprudence or as a mirage that will disap-
pear if we stare at it hard enough. Because they have based their criti-
cisms on an implausible judicial monopoly assumption, however, these
commentators have failed to show that the political doctrine question is
inconsistent with our constitutional tradition.
On the contrary, the political question doctrine is an integral part
of that tradition; it is largely concerned with distinguishing cases in
which courts will exercise their power of judicial review from those in
which they will not. In our system of government, the three branches of
the federal government share responsibility for interpreting the Consti-
tution. In general, the courts' role is to protect the oppressed from
abuses of government power. They refrain from exercising review in
cases far removed from that paradigm. We should understand the polit-
ical question doctrine as a device for projecting this shared reponsibility
scheme into areas where no substantive doctrine puts it into effect.
Judicial abstinence, in this sense, is not a threat to the rule of law;
296 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985), for example, the Court decided that the issue of what defines "traditional gov-
ernmental functions" could not be resolved in a satisfactory way. Accordingly, it aban-
doned an approach to federalism questions that depended on such a definition. See id.
at 537-47.
297 One can argue that using the political question doctrine for this purpose is
greatly preferable to formulating a substantive doctrine that eliminates meaningful ju-
dicial review. Ordinarily, when courts leave an issue to the political branches of govern-
ment, they should admit that they are doing so. If courts wrap their abstinence in a
substantive doctrine, they are more likely to mislead some members of Congress into
believing that any governmental action that gets past the courts is constitutional. A
frank statement that an issue is not for judicial resolution is more likely to make Con-
gress and the President aware of their responsibility for constitutional interpretation of
those issues.
[I]f we are wrong [legislators] say, the courts will correct it. If what I have
been saying is true, the safe and permanent road toward reform is that of
impressing upon our people a far stronger sense than they have of the
great range of possible harm and evil that our system leaves open, and
must leave open, to the legislatures, and of the clear limits of judicial
power; so that responsibility may be brought sharply home where it be-
longs . . . . Under no system can the power of courts go far to save a
people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere. If this be true, it is
of the greatest public importance to put the matter in its true light.
Thayer, supra note 87, at 155-56 (footnote omitted).
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constitutional norms can be meaningful even without judicial enforce-
ment. Moreover, abstinence with respect to certain constitutional issues
is a necessary implication of the rule of law. Our law requires that
courts contain the conflict between the myth of law and the myth of
politics. Without relying on formalism, they can maintain a balance
between those two myths only by limiting the exercise of judicial
review.
In the last analysis, the legitimacy of judicial review depends on a
shared sense that judges should enforce the Constitution in order to
preserve our fundamental liberties. Any exercise of judicial review that
seems far removed from this purpose will provoke charges of judicial
usurpation. The political question doctrine allows courts to remove
themselves from areas in which they do not belong so that they may
focus on the important tasks our system alots to them. By doing so, they
can avoid calling the legitimacy of their actions into question.
